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David A. Smeltzer
In the twentieth century the debate over the
ideological origins of the founding period and early
republic has resulted in a polarization of historical
interpretations.

Recently, the conflict has centered on

historians who use either the liberal or classical
republican paradigms to explain these eras.

Scholars of the

founding period have argued for the dominance of one
political ideology or the other in the thought of important
figures of this time.

Unfortunately, this struggle has led

to a narrow interpretation of arguably the greatest thinker
in American History, James Madison.

To the contrary, I hold

Madison's thought was influenced by both liberal and

2

classical republican ideas, and in this thesis I explore
that interpretation.
The bulk of the primary sources upon which this thesis
rests come from the most current edition of Madison's
writings, a fifteen volume set that runs through 1795.
Contrary to conventional methods of analyzing Madison's
thought that stress his famous public works, in particular
The Federalist, this thesis gives Madison's private
correspondence equal attention on the grounds that in them
Madison elaborated his ideas most fully.

Using such an

approach led to an interpretation of Madison as both a
liberal and republican thinker.

In this regard I present

his thought as sui generis and influenced by more than one
ideology.
The organization of the thesis is governed by my
presentation of Madison as sui generis.

In chapter two,

where I discuss Madison's thought on the nation's security,
the republican Madison comes to the forefront.

On this

point, he combined English Opposition convictions about the
need for a vigilant citizenry with complementary republican
ideas drawn from Montesquieu concerned with providing wisdom
and stability in government.

Madison used portions of both

to forge ideological weapons designed to protect the
republic.
However, Madison also heartily embraced liberal
doctrines, my topic in chapter three.

With regard to the

3

concept of natural rights, there was never a more committed
advocate of inalienable rights than he.

In addition, his

theory of interest was a more positive doctrine than current
historians, who have studied Madison's theory of interest
solely through The Federalist, recognize.

Madison

understood that advancement of the public good occurred only
when lawmakers understood the varied interests of the
nation.

Despite historians' rhetoric to the contrary, in

Madison's mind liberalism and republicanism were not
antithetical.
Nowhere is Madison's joining of liberal and republican
ideas clearer than in his views on political economy.

This

part of his ideology, the best example of the way he wove
together portions of both ideologies, is the focus of
chapter four.

Madison glorified the virtuous farmer as the

bulwark of the republic.

However, he also encouraged

development of a robust, aggressive, commerce based on
agricultural surplus.

To his mind, agriculture maintained

republican character, and exporting of surpluses provided
individuals the opportunity to pursue their innate desire
for self betterment.
Interpretations of Madison's thought suffer, in short,
because historians focus on single ideological paradigms
and, in doing so, use sources narrowly.

One ideology,

either liberal or republican, and one source, specifically
The Federalist, cannot adequately explain this thinker.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
According to historian Peter Onuf many scholars view
the recent Constitutional bicentennial as an intellectual
failure because it failed to produce new interpretations of
the founding period.

However, Onuf took issue with this

conclusion on the grounds that critics did not understand
how interpretations regarding this epoch were "being
redefined." 1

To Onuf the recent debate over the

intellectual heritage of the founding period had contributed
to a greater understanding of the "complexities of American
republican thought." 2

With regard to James Madison, one of

the most enigmatic yet essential actors of this period,
Onuf's observation deserves serious attention.
Despite the longevity of his career and his prominent
role in politics from the Revolution until his death in
1836, Madison has not captured anywhere near the scholarly
attention as have Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and
Hamilton.

Arguably, he contributed more in the long run to

the American republic than any of the others.
1

He served as

Peter S. Onuf, "Reflections on the Founding:
Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective,"
William and Mary Quarterly, 46.2 (April 1989), 341-375, 341.
2

Ibid., 342.
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a political theoretician, a representative at both the
national and local level, Secretary of State, and President.
In retirement he remained active as a political "guru" of
the republic.
The very complexity of Madison's thought and the
longevity of his career makes him difficult to pin down.
Even today noted scholars back away from tackling his career
and thought in full.

3

While acknowledging the richness and

diversity of Madison's thought, little in the way of serious
effort has been given to drawing out the complexity of his
Scholars have described Madison as acting from a

mind.

singular motive or ideology.

Two ideological

interpretations, in particular, have dominated Madison
studies.
Currently, the debate over Madison's ideology centers
on his ideas as exclusively ''republican" or "liberal."
Scholars applying one paradigm or the other have depicted
Madison as either a selfless patriot or scheming aristocrat.
Historians such as J.G.A. Pocock, Caroline Robbins, Bernard
Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Lance Banning, and Drew McCoy, who use
the republican paradigm, have traced the development and
transformation of its ideology from ancient Greece, to
3

Two conspicuous examples are Robert Rutland, James
Madison: The Founding Father (New York: McMillian, 1987),
which focuses on Madison's life after the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, and Drew McCoy's recent, The Last of the
Founding Fathers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), which deals above all with Madison's views on
slavery, primarily after 1815.
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sixteenth century Florentine, Italy, seventeenth century
England, and finally to eighteenth century America. 4
According to scholars who apply the republican paradigm, the
Founding Fathers drew deeply on republican doctrine during
the Revolution and the republic's formative years.

Central

to these scholars' delineation of republican doctrine is the
concept of virtue.

Virtue in a republican context referred

to the public good, that is the ability of a republic's
citizenry to put public needs above private desires.

Virtue

in this manner demanded a certain political and social order
designed to insure a republic's survival.

A political

system which balanced power between an executive,
legislative, and judicial branch was essential.

Basically a

static theory, classical republicanism defined the state as
an organic entity.

Republican doctrine held that change in

the political structure was evil.

Every alteration

indicated an increase in age and pointed to a corruption of
the society's fundamental principles, a sure sign of a
republic's decay and inevitable destruction.
According to the theory, a republic must remain small
to guarantee that its citizens remained a homogenous body
dedicated to public matters.

Republican theory insisted,

furthermore, on the necessity of its members economic
independence.

Equality among citizens was an important

component of the social order.
4

While equality did not refer

For a list of relevant works see below, note twelve.
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to an absolute, equal distribution of wealth, it did allude
to a type of economic parity in which citizens avoided
dependence on others for their livelihood.

Usually an

agrarian lifestyle gained prominence over others because in
theory it allowed citizens to provide for themselves without
relying on others.

This independence allowed the body

.Politic to remain pure, and thwart those who might use
economic coercion to advance their self interest at the
expense of the public.
viewed as evil.

By the same token, self interest was

It corrupted the republic's collective

character, and threatened its stability by introducing
values that destroyed the public, homogenous nature which
held the community together.

Republican ideology denied the

individual, and instructed citizens to devote themselves to
public service.
In contrast to historians who stress classical
republican tenets as the basis for the founding era, those
historians who emphasize the discourse of liberalism--Louis
Hartz, Joyce Appleby, John Patrick Diggins, and Issac
Kramnick, in particular--maintain an ideology of
individualism comprised the principles upon which American
politics was based. 5

Drawn from the works of John Locke

and Adam Smith, liberalism held that the best society is one
that allows the individual to advance his self interest.

5

Important liberal sources are cited in notes
fourteen, fifteen and sixteen.

5

Government's role was small, and consisted mainly of
governing only enough to insure that all had a fair
opportunity to develop their economic potential.
Liberalism, then, encouraged individual self interest.
Equality of opportunity was the watchword of its adherents.
Whereas republican doctrine demanded that citizens share the
quality of civic virtue, liberal doctrine emphasized the
right--the so-called natural right--of individuals to choose
their own religious, economic and political values.

From

the liberal perspective progress took on a more positive
light.

Rather than an indication of decay, it signified a

positive step.

Change was a natural characteristic of an

aggressive, individualistic people putting their abilities
to work.

Historians of the liberal persuasion see the

values of self interest, competition, and economic
development beyond the countryside providing a national
ideological consensus.
The idea of self interest, then, undergirds the liberal
interpretation of the founding epoch,
virtue bolsters the republican.

just as the concept of

Understood in such a

manner, these definitions provide the pivot upon which this
thesis turns.

Those who have written about Madison have

tended to make him into either a republican or liberal.
Madison scholarship seems like a tug of war, with Madison
caught in the middle.

Each side has attempted to pull his

character to one side and explain his actions through a one

6

dimensional interpretative framework.
While this thesis surveys Madison's political theory in
light of considerations raised by recent scholarship on the
republican and liberal tradition, it is important to note
that published studies of this founder throughout the
twentieth century have been marked by narrow, one
dimensional portraits.

Progressive historians, reacting in

the early twentieth century against what they considered as
uncritical, reverential nineteenth century interpretations
of the founding period, followed the lead of J. Allen Smith.
Smith's The Spirit of American Government was the opening
salvo in the Progressive attack on the men at the
Constitutional Convention, one of whom was James Madison. 6
Along similar lines, Charles Beard's Economic Interpretation
of the Constitution became the lightning rod for a
generation of constitutional scholars.

Like Smith, Beard

held that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention had
protection of their interests and property in mind as they
formed the new government.

Economic motives, he argued, not

political ideology, provided the impetus for political
reform.

Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis,

Beard's "economic determinism" drew on Madison's "Tenth
Federalist" for support, insuring the character of Madison
6

James Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government
(New York: MacMillian, 1907.)
See Richard Hofstadter's, The
Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), for an overview of the
Progressive historians.
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would figure prominently in future debates over the
Constitution.
Beard's work reopened interest in the Constitutional
era and promoted--in particular through the controversy over
economic determinism--new interpretations of Madison.
offspring of Beard was the pluralist view.

One

With regards to

interpretations of Madison, the pluralist perspective
contains two different views, one negative and the other
positive.

In general both pluralist views hold that Madison

recognized the diverse interests of American society, and
actively incorporated them into the new Constitutional
system.

Pluralists differ, however, in regard to Madison's

reasons for encouraging multiple interests to influence the
new government.

Positive pluralists maintain Madison wanted

interest groups to participate directly in government and
have a voice in the formation of policy.

Negative

pluralists argue that Madison formed a government in which
different interests negated each other by design, allowing
the colonial elite to govern with little interference.
From the turn of the century to the end of World War
II, the works of Harold Laski, Harold Bentley, and Walter
Lippman provide the best example of the former view, the
positive pluralist interpretation. 7
7

As Paul Bourke has

See Harold Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty (New
York: Books for Libraries Press, 1921, 1968); Walter
Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1922, 1949);
and Arthur Bentley, Process of Government (Evanston, IL: the
Principia Press of Illinois 1908, 1935).

8

shown, this affirmative perception contrasted with Beardian
interpretations in that they praised the founders for
advancing their self interest.

Commonly referred to as

"interest group theorists, those who have pressed the
"positive pluralist view" described Madison's "Tenth
Federalist'' as exhibiting an "essentially modern grasp of
the group character of politics and of the play of organized
groups on political institutions.

118

In this view Madison

was an ally of those looking to decentralize the authority
of the political state, and distribute it among various
interest groups.
In contrast, the negative pluralist view of Madison
advanced a Beardian line.
World War II.

It regained prominence after

Its foremost adherents were scholars such as

James McGregor Burns, Robert Dahl, and Frank M. Coleman.
They depicted the Constitution as an elitist document and
maintained that Madison and his cohorts designed it to
thwart majority rule through a scheme of checks and
balances. 9

Government under the new Constitution--as

devised by Madison--sought to frustrate the will of the
majority.
8

Paul F. Bourke, "The Pluralist Reading of James
Madison's Tenth Federalist," Perspectives in American
History, 9 (1975), 271-295, 273.
9

Consult Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); James
McGregor Burns, Deadlock of Democracy (New York: McGraw Hill
Book Co., 1971); and Frank M. Coleman, "The Hobbesian Basis
of American Constitutionalism," Polity, 7.1 (1974), 57-89.

9

Since World War II both pluralist visions of Madison
and the founding era have drawn fire from scholars who
downplay the role of interest in eighteenth century politics
and emphasize, instead, ideological factors.

The fifties--

still the most noteworthy decade in terms of Madison
scholarship--saw the brilliant work of Adrienne Koch, Irving
Brant, Neal Riemer, Martin Diamond, and Douglas Adair.
Adair, in a series of articles and an unpublished but often
cited dissertation, argued that the ideology of the Scottish
Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume, provided Madison with
his ideas of faction and the extended republic. 10

Brant,

in his multi-volume biography of Madison, along with other
works by Koch, Riemer, and Diamond, stressed Madison's
commitment to representative government, implicitly drawing
out the Lockean influences in his thought. 11

From their

works Madison emerged as more democratic, and the importance

10

Douglas Adair, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited,"
William and Mary Quarterly, 8.1 (January 1951), 467-487; and
"That Politics May Be Reduced to Science: David Hume, James
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," Huntington Library
Quarterly, 20.4 (August 1957), 343-360. These two articles
are good summaries of Adair's theories concerning Madison's
ideological influences.
11

Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1941-61.); Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and
Madison: The Great Collaboration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1950); Neal Riemer, "The Republicanism of James Madison,"
Political Science Quarterly, 69 (March 1954), 45-64; and
"James Madison's Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of
Republican Government," Ethics 65 (October 1954), 34-43; and
Martin Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist: A
Reconsideration of the Framer's Intent," American Political
Science Review, 53 (March 1959), 52-68.

10
of political ideology to his thought appeared paramount.
During the late sixties and early seventies, however,
yet another paradigm of the founders' thought appeared, and
interpretations of Madison underwent another revision.

The

classical republican revolution among American historians
discarded economic and Lockean interpretations of the
founding era, and instead argued for the primacy of English
Opposition thought as the fuel which ignited the
revolutionary fires of the eighteenth century.

J.G.A.

Pocock and Caroline Robbins traced the ancient, European,
and English development of classical republican thought (or
civic humanism) to America.

Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood

analyzed the transformation and manifestation of Opposition
thought in its American setting before and during the
Revolutionary and founding periods. 12
12

The literature produced by classical historians is
voluminous.
Some of the more important works are J.G.A.
Pocock The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975; Caroline Robbins The
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealth Man: Studies in the
Transmission, Development, and Circumstance of English
Liberal Thought From the Restoration Charles II until the
War with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959); Bernard Bailyn The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood The Creation of the
American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1969); Lance Banning The Jeffersonian
Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive
Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). Robert
Shalhope has provided two historiographical analyses of
republicanism in "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The
Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American

11
Following the lead of Robbins, Pocock, Bailyn and Wood,
other scholars who use the republican model interpreted
Madison in new ways.

Lance Banning, in The Jeffersonian

Persuasion, depicted Madison as a quintessential classical
republican.

He saw the Jeffersonians as reacting to

Federalist modernizing policies in much the same manner as
had Radical Whigs in seventeenth and eighteenth century
England.

Just as the Whigs, the so-called "Country" bloc,

stubbornly resisted the English "Court" party's seventeenth
century attempt to usher in a new, commercial society based
on financial manipulation, so, according to Banning, did the
Jeffersonians resent the development-minded policies of
Alexander Hamilton.

In each instance, English and American

"country thinkers'' saw their adversaries as innately
corrupt.
Drew McCoy sketched an even clearer picture of Madison
as a classical republican in the Elusive Republic.

Studying

Madison's political ideology, McCoy depicted Madison's
support for an agrarian society as an attempt to expand
across time rather than space.

According to McCoy, Madison

favored geographic expansion to slow America's progression
toward a manufacturing society, anathema to classical
republicans who viewed modernity as innately corrupt.

To

Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 29.1 (January
1972), 49-80, and "Republicanism and Early American
Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 39.2 (April
1982), 334-356.
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both Banning and McCoy, Madison was always looking backwards
to find the true republican society.
the future.

13

He fought to forestall

He feared change because it threatened to

destroy the economic and political principles upon which the
republic's security rested.
Like the Lockean and economic interpretations of the
founding era, republican explanations stressed the dominance
of one ideology.

From 1968 to 1980 this view of eighteenth

century American society--and of Madison--reigned supreme.
Convincing challenges to this monolithic view appeared
slowly and has left the historiography of Madison and the
founding period in a state of flux.
Joyce Appleby first attacked the classical view of the
founding period.

Appleby refocused scholarly attention on a

different set of principles: the liberal, Lockean, and Adam
Smithian.

She finds in these the heart of Jeffersonian

ideology.

Appleby undermined much of classical

historiography by showing liberal ideas competed openly with
Radical Whig paradigms in both seventeenth century England
and late eighteenth century America. 14

Yet unlike older

pluralist interpretations, which used the concept of self
interest to describe either a political attempt by a
13

See note 9 for bibliographical information on
McCoy's and Banning's monographs.
14

Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in
Seventeenth Century England (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1978); and Capitalism and the New Social Order (New
York: New York University Press, 1984).

13

colonial elite to thwart majority rule, or depicted the
founders as advocating a modern concept of interest group
politics, Appleby presented a broader and more egalitarian
picture of liberalism.

Echoing, and pushing beyond, Louis

Hartz's Liberal Tradition in America she maintained that
individualistic Lockean doctrines permeated the political,
economic, and social structure of America in the 1790s.
Jeffersonian liberalism, in Appleby's view, encouraged a
democratic, informal type of politics open to all, not just
a colonial elite.

Jeffersonians, she continued, espoused a

doctrine of rough equality, which in turn threatened a
dominant colonial upper class, represented by the
Federalists.

Far from being a source of republican distrust

and fear, Appleby showed that ideas of self interest,
commerce, and prosperity swayed men of this time as much as
republican ideas of virtue, frugality and self sufficiency.
Appleby's Madison, therefore, appeared decidedly more
modern, economically and politically, than did the Madison
of McCoy or Banning.
Others have sided with Appleby.

Isaac Kramnick has

noted that eighteenth century republican ideology was not
without competitors.

He maintained that at least four

different paradigms competed for supremacy during the
formative years of the republic.

Republican, liberal, work

ethic Protestantism, and state centered theories of power
and sovereignty proliferated and citizens easily interwove

14
strands of each into their discourse. 15
John Patrick Diggins, on the other hand, has classified
the hunt for classical republican thought in eighteenth
century America as a snipe hunt. 16

According to Diggins,

republican historians have mistaken Calvinistic doctrines
for civic humanism because both stressed concern with the
.Public good.

For Diggins, the foundations of American

society rested on Lockean and Calvinist principles.

He held

that republican scholars viewed the founding period as
ideologically alienated from the present.
principles had transpired.

A change of

They surmised, wrongly according

to Diggins, that liberalism had, at some time, replaced
republican principles as the guiding precepts of American
society.

He maintained that America seemed divorced from

its original maxims because the crucial corrective to
unfettered Lockean liberalism, Calvinism, had vanished from
the American mind.
While Diggins deplored modern liberalism, he argued
that its roots spring from a moral liberal tradition active
in the Republic's early years.

While Diggins stressed the

dominance of liberal doctrines in American History, he
interpreted Madison in a different manner.

For all of his

15

Isaac Kramnick, "The 'Great National Discussion':
The Discourse of Politics in 1787," William and Mary
Quarterly, 45.1 (January 1988), 3-32.
16

John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American
Politics: Virtue, Self Interest, and the Foundations of
Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

15

insistence on the presence of Calvinism during the
Constitutional era, he imparted little of it to Madison's
character.

Following the older pluralist tradition in this

instance, Diggins characterized Madison as anti-democratic,
determined to use government to manipulate diverse
interests, protect the wealthy, and frustrate the will of
the majority.

Diggins, in this instance, fell into a neo-

Beardian mindset, and thus explained Madison's motivation
during the founding era as a plot to entrench the colonial
aristocracy.

Protection of economic power was his

preeminent, if not only, goal.

In this regard Diggins added

the weight of his scholarship to an explanatory model of
Madison which was already anchored in a mire of narrow
interpretations.
With the notable exceptions of Kramnick and Appleby,
twentieth century scholars described Madison through a
singular paradigm, liberal or classical.

Both arguments are

valid in so far as they delineate aspects of Madison's
ideology.

Both err, however, in assuming the singularity of

his mind.
As of yet no historian of the founding era has sought
to understand the classical side of Madison while also
taking into account the recent demonstration of competing
ideological voices in eighteenth century America.

This

thesis argues that a fuller understanding of Madison is
possible only by approaching his thought as sui generis and

16
composed of an intermixture of both republican and liberal
doctrines.
Here I analyze Madison from the Revolution to 1795. The
dates correspond roughly to the time covered by the most
recent edition of Madison's writings. 17

Two important

methodological premises deserve mention.

First, in order to

investigate the common assumption that Madison altered his
ideology after 1788, his works before and after the
Constitutional Convention demanded equal attention. 18
Second, the research concentrated on Madison's private
writings as much as his public ones.

The greatest

shortcoming of Madisonian scholarship is its reliance on The
Federalist.

A series of articles written during a partisan

political struggle and under exacting time constraints, I
hold, should not be made into the sole "authoritative"
Madison text.

For years scholars have interpreted Madison

through his actions in 1787 and 1788.

To the contrary, a

17

The completion of Madison's papers, previously under
the editorship of Robert Rutland and presently J.C.A. Stagg,
is underway.
18

A good example of this is exhibited by a recent
exchange between two White House lawyers and Theodore Draper
over the nature of executive power.
In the article, the two
legal counselors argue that Madison's true political beliefs
were articulated at the Constitutional Convention and in the
text of The Federalist. According to the two lawyers,
Madison's later writings resulted from "purely political
motives" dictated by his emergence as a Jeffersonian
oppositional leader opposed to Federalist policies. His
later writings, they hold, carry little validity when
dealing with issues concerning the Constitution. Consult,
"The Constitution in Danger," New York Review of Books, 37.8
(17 May 1990), 50-53.

17

balanced account of Madison must grant as much authority to
his private correspondence.

While The Federalist is not

excluded, it received less emphasis than tradition has
previously demanded.
Three chapters comprise the heart of this thesis.
explores a different side of Madison's thought.

Each

Chapter two

examines the "classical" Madison through two different
strains of republicanism prominent in his thought, the
Radical Whig tradition and the writings of Montesquieu.
Radical Whig and Montesquieuian republicanism are alike in
some ways, and different in others.

Both believed in the

concept of virtue, and the need for a homogenous, stable
population as essential to a republic.

Yet, Radical Whig

theory was concerned more with corruption and abuse of
power.

It had a more defined political program.

Its

adherents in the United States took on a character that
rejected the balance of power theory and advocated
legislative supremacy.

Representatives were to be mirrors

of the population they served, and hold office for short
terms to avoid corruption and increase accountability.
In contrast, Montesquieu's republicanism is more theoretical
than pragmatic, and while concerned with abuse of power, did
not exhibit the paranoid fear of power prominent among
English Opposition thinkers such as Algernon Sidney, John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.

Montesquieu wrote of the

general characteristics of republics and examined standard

18

doctrines such as the balance of power.

He was concerned as

much, if not more, with the stability of the republic as
with protecting it from pernicious forces.
Madison employed the philosophy of both republican
views as ideological weapons to protect the new American
republic.

The first part of the chapter, on Madison and

Radical Whiggery, reveals the paranoid Madison, one
concerned continually with insidious political and religious
plots designed to enslave Americans.

The second half of the

chapter probes Madison's conception of the Senate, to him
the crucial vessel of virtue.

He believed a properly

constructed Senate represented the establishment of virtue
within government.

If Radical Whig ideology protected

society from detrimental internal and external threats, the
Senate protected the stability of the new nation by acting
with Montesquian coolness and reason.

In Madison's mind, it

was always attuned to the public good.
Chapter three turns to the ''liberal" Madison.

In it I

seek to blunt the pluralist criticism of Madison.
Pluralists who write in a Beardian vein have referred to
Madison's doctrine of minority rights as proof of his
complicity in plots to frustrate majority rule.

His ardent

support of property, they have held, also indicates his
elitist tendencies.

Yet, considered through his actions and

other writings--that is his life outside The Federalist--it
seems clear that Madison held to a theory of property that

19
was Lockean.

Furthermore, Madison's well developed

philosophy of minority rights displays a logical application
of natural law to civil society.

To Madison's mind,

majority rule must reign supreme, but could never infringe
natural rights.

Subsequently, the individual and socially

marginal groups--not the social elite of the colonies--found
a champion in Madison.
The second half of the chapter revises conventional
interpretations of Madison's theory of interest.

Looking

beyond The Federalist Papers reveals the lopsided view most
scholars have taken towards Madison's doctrine of interest.
Described in The Federalist Papers as a negative force,
other evidence exists to show that for Madison interest
advanced properly was not evil, but an important part of the
process of discerning the public good.
Chapter four explores, through an analyses of Madison's
political economy, what Isaac Kramnick referred to as "the
profusion and confusion of political tongues among the
founders. " 19

Madison's thought in this regard manifests a

blending of classical and liberal tenets.

While an advocate

of free trade and the releasing of individual initiative,
Madison also held to republican ideas which upheld the moral
and political benefits of an agrarian society.

No better

example of the sui generis nature of Madison's thought

19

Isaac Kramnick, "The 'Great National Discussion':
The Discourse of Politics in 1787," 4.
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exists than his political economy.
Explaining Madison through the lens of one ideology
does injustice to one of the most profound American
thinkers. Madison himself once noted "there is a middle way
to be taken which corresponds at once with the theory of
free government and the lessons of experience.
of Madison should heed his words.

1120

Scholars

To adherents of the

liberal and classical paradigms, Madison acted either solely
out of self interest, or conducted himself in a selfless
manner and expected the rest of society to adjust
accordingly.

The middle way is missing in most of their

works, and it is time to describe Madison in the same terms
that he used, three years before his death, to characterize
the American system of government, "emphatically sui
generis. 1121

20

Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973), Madison to John
Brown, 12 October 1788, 58.
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Madison to Daniel Webster, 15 March 1833, quoted in
Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 149.

CHAPTER II
THE CLASSICAL MADISON: TYRANNY AND VIRTUE
In a recent biography, Drew McCoy stressed the
importance of republican ideology to Madison's thought,
especially his ability to act in a cool, objective manner.
Following McCoy's lead, this chapter explores the influence
of classical republicanism on Madison's thought.

While not

arguing for an interpretation of Madison as solely
classical, this chapter shows aspects of Madison's thought
depended upon tenets of civic humanism.

In particular,

Madison's struggle for freedom of conscience has long been
used to reveal the influence of Lockean principles.
However, Madison's concern for religious freedom reveals
more than a concern for civil rights.
influence of radical Whig ideology.

It also shows the
Madison's fear of a

political and religious conspiracy showed his persistent,
and very republican, concern that a corrupted government
could subvert liberty and lead to tyranny.
Furthermore, Madison's view of the Senate coincided
with classical descriptions of an upper-house.

His

description of the functions of the Senate was similar to
Montesquieu.
faction.

The upper-house would use virtue to check

A virtuous Senate combined with a citizenry imbued

22

with republican values were key ingredients to keeping
America stable and free.

When Madison used republican

language it habitually concerned protection of the republic.
Historians now realize that Americans used the ideology
of Radical Whiggery to grasp the significance of the acts
initiated by the British Parliament following 1763.

These

acts were not seen as prudent, moderate attempts to
stabilize British finances.

Colonists, rather, molded Whig

ideology to their own circumstances, and viewed each act as
a deliberate precedent setting measure of a corrupt and
devious British monarchy intent on reducing the colonists to
a state of dependence.

Tyranny would replace liberty unless

the colonists halted the process before their bonds rendered
them unable to resist.
According to revolutionary thinkers who drew upon Whig
doctrines, a key conspirator in this plot to enslave the
colonist was the Anglican church.
of the church were widespread.

Before 1763, suspicions

Talk of establishing an

episcopate in the colonies caused people to fear the church.
Especially troublesome was the creation in 1701 of the
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, a branch of the
Anglican church formed to evangelize native Americans.
colonists believed its true aim consisted of a "formal
design to root out Presbyterianism, etc., and to

Many
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establishing both episcopacy and bishops." 1

The events

that transpired after 1763 convinced many colonists that the
Anglican church threatened not only religious freedom, but
was part of a larger British attempt to deprive Americans of
their liberty.

By 1765, many colonists assumed "the

stamping of and episcopizing [of] our colonies were ... only
different branches of the same plan of power." 2

One of

those men affected by this idea of a dual religiouspolitical conspiracy to subjugate Americans was James
Madison.

To paraphrase the remarks of J.G.A. Pocock,

Madison, in opposing Anglican establishment, spoke the
language of the country party (Radical Whiggery) and knew he
spoke it. 3
Madison's first public act showing his concern over
British activities occurred during his days at the College
of New Jersey (Princeton) .

He was an early and always

prominent member of the American Whig society.

In reality

the club devoted most of its time to satiric (and sometimes
obscene poems) aimed at the more piously minded Clios,

1

Jonathan Mayhew, "Observations on the Charter and
Conduct of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in
Foreign Parts," (Boston, 1763): 103-108. Quoted in Bernard
Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 96.
2

Alden Bradford, Memoir of the Life and Writings of
Rev. Jonathan Mayhew (Boston, 1838), 372. Quoted in Ibid,
97.
3

J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 529. Pocock's
actual words are "The Jeffersonians spoke the language of
the country and knew they spoke it."
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called Tories by Madison and friends because it proved the
worst insult possible.

While the club spent most of its

time in social activities, the political connotations are
evident from the names.

The name "American Whig" referred

in 1768 to the pen name of William Livingston, a man who had
vigorously opposed an attempt by the Anglican church to
strengthen church-state ties by creating an American
episcopate.

Members of the American Whig Society joined the

club because they felt it offered a means to counter British
attempts to establish a new set of royal church governors in
the colonies. 4
Madison, in joining the Whig club, revealed his
opposition to the continued creation of offices in America
for placemen, which he saw continuing the process of
corruption.

Customs enforcement offices created by the

Townshend duties of 1770, and the attempt to create more
posts for clergymen, revealed the insidious plot by the
crown to continue to take further political power from the
assemblies, and religious freedom from all.
Madison's concern over a dual political and religious
threat to liberty was fully apparent in a candid letter to
his college alumnus, William Bradford, in 1774.

Commenting

on the Boston Tea Party, Madison declared that while
4

Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:84-86. Brant reveals
that Livingston's fight over church state separation began
in 1752 when he published the "Independent Reflector," in
which he opposed using public funds to support a parochial
school.
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Bostonians might have used more discretion, they had
accomplished one important goal.

Political and even

military contests were needed to "instruct in the Art of
defending Liberty and property."

Madison felt the British

assaults on the colonies, especially Boston, had a positive
side in so far as the attacks stopped any notion of Anglican
establishment in the northern colonies, an institution
Madison himself suffered under in Virginia.

Madison claimed

that if the Anglicans had succeeded, "slavery and Subjection
would have been gradually insinuated among us."

The problem

resulted because established churches "tend to great
ignorance and Corruption, all of which facilitate the
Execution of mischievous Projects." 5
Madison here reiterated a common revolutionary Whig
theme.

An established church becomes dangerous because it

can be manipulated by individuals bent on tyranny.

The King

and his ministers were usually identified as instigators of
this plot.

Not surprisingly, Madison condemned in this same

letter the "ministerialism'' of Massachusetts Governor
Hutchinson, whose patronage machine provided an obvious
example to American Whigs of anti-republican corruption.
Madison's fear of the Anglican church caused him to act
in ways uncharacteristic of the future champion of civil and
5

William T. Hutchinson and Robert A. Rutland, et.al.,
The Papers of James Madison, 15 vols. (Charlottesville, Va:
University of Virginia Press, and Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962-1985), Madison to William Bradford, 24
January 1774, 1:105. Hereafter cited as JM.
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religious rights.

In June of 1775 the Continental Congress

designated July 20 as a day of public fasting and prayer in
order to bring King George to a "reasonable" state of mind.
An Anglican parish priest, Madison informed a friend,
refused to "observe the fast or preach on that day" pleading
freedom of conscience.

As a member of the Orange County

Committee of Safety, Madison participated in closing the
church and stopping the minister's salary stopped.

Indeed,

if the man did not stop his insolence Madison warned that he
might get "ducked in a coat of tar and surplus of feathers
and then he may go ... and act under the lawful authority of
Genl. Gage." 6

Three months earlier the committee had

visited the rector of the church the Madisons attended.
Reverend John Wingate apparently had possession of several
pamphlets which condemned the actions of the Continental
Congress.

When the pastor refused to turn over the

requested pamphlets, the group took the pamphlets, most
likely by force, and burned them because they contained "the
most imprudent falsehoods and malicious artifices ... "
designed to "excite divisions among the friends of
America." 7

As for the author of the pamphlets, a New York

Loyalist by the name of Rivington, Madison declared his wish

6

7

JM, Madison to William Bradford, 28 July 1775, 1:161.

Irving Brant, James Madison. 1:162-63. The quote is
from a declaration the Orange Committee of Safety issued
before burning the pamphlets. Brant has "good reason to
believe" Madison was the author.
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to have "Rivington and his ministerial gazetteers for 24
hours in this place.

Execrable as their designs are, they

would meet with adequate punishment," most likely tar and
feathers, a favorite punishment of Madison at this time. 8
Madison's intolerance of the Anglican clergy
underscored his fear that the Church remained a threat to
American liberty.

The work of corrupt men like Rivington

and "his ministerial gazetteers" fostered disunion and
hampered the colonists' attempt to stave off corruption.
Madison would not concede the Anglicans' argument for
"freedom of opinion," denouncing it as rhetoric used in the
plot against liberty.

What is unique about Madison's

attitude and actions was the fact it aimed only at
Anglicans, who in the colonies embodied "the wickedness of
the present Ministry." 9

In contrast, he tolerated other

religious sects who did not abide by the rules of the
Continental Congress because they were not part of the plot
to enslave the colonists.
In January of 1775 Madison contemplated the decision of
Quakers not to sign the Continental Association.

In a

8

Ibid., Madison to William Bradford, Early March
1775, 1:141. Madison's disposition to tar and feathers is
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He contrasted the spirit of
Virginians, who recently tarred and feathered a man who
treated one of the members of the Committee with disrespect,
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9
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letter to William Bradford, the young Virginian remarked he
could not "forbear suspecting them to be under the controul
and direction" of the British, "for I take those of them
that we have to be too honest and simple to have any
sinister or secret Views .... "

While Madison did not think

anything in the Association "inconsistent with their
religious princ[i]ples," he respected their view. 10

To

him, the difference between the Quakers and Anglicans was
that Quaker religious precepts were genuine, while the
Anglicans used theirs to advance a "deliberate systematic
plan of reducing us to slavery." 11

Thus Madison was

willing to grant Quakers the freedom of their convictions,
despite his disagreement with them, while he denied the same
rights to Anglicans, who, in his opinion, would use their
freedom to subvert rather than nurture liberty.
Other aspects of Madison's thought during this time
also testify to the influence of Whig ideology, particularly
the doctrine of precedence.

Whig political theory stressed

the deference of the people to their rulers.

It stressed

social stability, but by implying the people were normally
docile Whigs implied that they would revolt only when a true
threat existed.

To Madison, as to other Whig minded

revolutionaries, the idea of precedence was all important,

10
11

Ibid., 135.

Thomas Jefferson, "A Summary View," quoted in Gordon
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 39.
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for if an act of the government caused strife among the
people one could be sure a conspiracy against liberty
existed.

In turn, once sinister forces bent on enslavement

of the citizenry became known, the people should "thus
resist the forces of tyranny before they were actually
enslaved." 12

Whigs, therefore, scrupulously examined acts

of government to see if any dangerous precedents existed,
and then acted to extinguish the threat before it unfolded.
The idea of opposing tyranny at its inception was
evident in Madison the revolutionary.

Madison chided his

friend William Bradford in 1774 for the instructions given
by the Pennsylvania Assembly to its delegates to the
Continental Congress.

Pennsylvania advised the delegates to

avoid all preparations for conflict and instead wait for the
Crown to come to its senses and repeal its "obnoxious"
legislation.

The Pennsylvanians, according to Madison,

counted too heavily on the "generosity & Justice of the
Crown" to act in a way favorable to the colonies.

Madison

thought it prudent to begin defense preparations and let
Parliament's reaction to the Congressional petitions decide
whether to cease or continue.

Delay on the colonies' part

"emboldens our adversaries," he insisted, cooled the united
passions of Americans against the British, and improved the
schemes of "our ... secret enemies to disseminate discord &

12
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disunion. " 13
of the King.

Madison, then, would not wait for the reply
Only early preparation for conflict, not the

King's good will, preserved liberty.

Resting on one's

laurels allowed the agents of tyranny time to hamstring
liberty's defenders.
If Madison in this instance showed his concern with
.early organization to counter a conspiracy against liberty,
he developed it and the idea of precedent to a fuller extent
after the Revolution in his fight against religious
establishment in Virginia.

By 1785 Madison had served in

the Virginia Council of State, the Virginia Constitutional
Convention of 1776, the Virginia House of Delegates, and the
Continental Congress.

He was a seasoned politician, as he

displayed in the 1784 session of the Virginia legislature.
Before it came a measure to re-establish the Episcopal
church.

At the beginning of the session it appeared the

bill would pass.

Supporters of the measure also had a

powerful figure, Patrick Henry, on their side.

But by

stalling Madison postponed a vote on establishment until the
next session.
Henry.

He also artfully eliminated the threat of

Madison appealed to his ambition and worked to elect

him governor, eliminating the most important ally of

13
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establishment. 14
By holding the bill over until the next session Madison
believed opposition to establishment would appear.

Many

Virginians confirmed his opinion by removing many of its
supporters in the 1785 elections.

Even so two of his

allies, George and Wilson Nicholaus, felt that more needed
to be done to destroy the bill.

The Nicholaus' urged

Madison to write an appeal to the public, and he agreed.
The result was his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance." 15
Madison's work in this regard has long been hailed as
evidence of his devotion to Lockean, natural, rights.

What

has been neglected is the extent to which Madison's essay
also reflected classical sentiments.

Madison's fear of

tyranny, the machinations of a dual religious-political
conspiracy, his concern for precedence, and the language he
employed all displayed the influence of classical
republicanism.
In the first section of the essay, Madison gave a
concise and--and clearly Lockean--plea for the inalienable
14

Irving Brant, "Madison: On the Separation of Church
and State," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 8.1
(January 1951), 4-5.
15
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Remonstrance" while another tract opposed to the bill,
''Teacher's of Christian Religion," garnered 4899 signatures.
The greater significance of Madison's work lies in the
extent to which it revealed his own philosophy.
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right of freedom of conscience.

But, in addition, and most

important in this regard, the second section of the essay
developed the republican themes of corruption and tyranny
inherent in the bill.

With regards to the latter, Madison

noted that the preservation of a free government required
more than fidelity to the classical separation of
governmental departments.

Citizens devoted to republican

rule must also prevent any branch of government from
committing an even greater type of corruption.

They must

scrutinize the government's acts to insure that political
power never destroyed "the great barrier which defends the
rights of the people." 16

Classical theory taught that

corruption occurred whenever a branch of the government
assumed responsibilities not delegated to it.

As

Montesquieu pointed out in The Spirit of the Laws, once a
republic is corrupted the community could not remedy any
evils except "by removing the corruption and restoring lost
principles. " 17

In typical Whig fashion, Madison grimly

described the outcome if the "great barrier" was not reerected and government officials stopped from violating
their "metes and bounds."

Rulers guilty of such

encroachments, he warned, threatened to become "Tyrants."
16

JM,

"Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785,

8:299.
17

Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed.
Franz Neumann, trans. Thomas Nugent 2 vols. (New York:
Hafner Publishing, 1966), 1:8:12:117. This citation method
refers to volume, book, section, and page number.

33
"The people who submit to it ... are slaves. " 18
The fear of tyranny, so pervasive in Whig pamphlets
prior to the revolution, remained with Madison long after
the struggle for independence. 19

As Irving Brant has

pointed out, the language used by Madison in "Memorial and
Remonstrance" regarding tyranny and slavery did not consist
of a figurative use of the symbols of force; rather these
terms pointed back to the threat of British tyranny, which
the colonists had thwarted only after a long and arduous
struggle. 20

Madison implored his readers to destroy

establishment before chaos again engulfed the colonies.
Always aware of his audience, Madison illuminated the
consequences of tyranny in a form no Virginian could fail to
miss.

While they recognized the political "slavery"

described by Whig ideology, Virginians experienced it
intimately every day through the institution of chattel
slavery.

They knew better than anyone in the North the

depths such bondage entailed.
In section eight of "Memorial and Remonstrance" Madison
returned to, and underscored powerfully, his republican fear
of tyranny.
18

JM,
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"Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785,
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establishments had on civil society and warned that as often
as not they erected a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of
civil authority.

In most instances establishment upheld

"the thrones of political authority."

Rulers who wished to

subvert public liberty "have found an established clergy
convenient auxiliaries. " 21
merit whatsoever.

Establishment, then, had no

It pointed to spiritual tyranny and

political domination.

In this case Madison referred his

readers to history, and, most importantly to their
Revolutionary memory of the Anglican Church taking part in
the British scheme to enslave them.
The precedent of the bill for religious establishment
also drew Madison's attention.

In a letter to Jefferson in

January of 1785, he confided that establishment proved
obnoxious because of "its dishonorable principle and
dangerous tendency." 22

The tendency or precedent of the

bill called for quick action before the consequences could
be felt.

Whig ideology provided an ideological influence

which led Madison to recognize and resist tyranny at its
inception, and, in turn, he called on American citizens to
do the same.
Section three of "Memorial and Remonstrance" focused on
the need for early action against schemes of usurpation.
21

JM,
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it Madison declared that "it is proper to take alarm at the
first experiment on our liberties."

In addition, he

insisted that "we hold this prudent jealously to be the
first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest
characteristics of the late Revolution."

The American

revolutionaries "did not wait until usurped power had
strengthened itself ... and entangled the question in
precedents."
it. " 23

"We revere this lesson much too much to forget

Madison again referred his readers back to the

Revolution, reminding them that successful struggles against
tyranny resulted from those who anticipated the problem and
eliminated it before precedents gave it the semblance of
legality and tradition.
This, as Madison put it, "jealousy" of liberty was, to
him, both a duty and a right fought for in the Revolution,
one stamped deeply in the memory of every American.

The

lessons of the Revolution--here seen through the lens of
English Opposition ideology--provided the key to resisting
establishment.
With all of the above, however, Madison was not done
drawing parallels between the Revolution and the present.
In an offhand but recognizable reference, he underscored his
point that the establishment of one sect could also lead to
religious and political domination.

23
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"which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the establishment of one religion," Madison
wrote, "may force him to conform to any other establishment
in all cases whatsoever. 1124

The importance of this phrase

rests with the monetary sum Madison used.

All those that

had fought in the Revolution knew what he implied.

The

three pence tax referred to the 1773 tax on tea which
triggered a series of events leading to the Boston Tea Party
and, ultimately, revolution. 25

Madison argued that

establishment carried the same seeds of tyranny as the Tea
Act, but was clothed in a different guise.

He pointed out

the precedent of this act, taken by itself, like the Tea
Act, did not seem destructive.

However, viewed in context

both acts were part of a grand plot against liberty.
Harkening his readers back to the Revolution, Madison again
linked political and religious actions, reminding them that
religion and politics were complementary bedfellows when
used by those intent on tyranny.

Establishment provided

only one step toward subjugation, but an important one.
America, Madison reminded his readers, owed its liberty to
acting before it was too late.
Madison drew one more parallel to show the danger of
establishment.

The bill for establishment, "distant as it

may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs
24
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only in degree. " 26

Madison again revealed his classical

fear that one step of corruption would eventually lead to
tyranny.

Precedent here as well was important.

The analogy

Madison drew to show the possible consequences of the bill
must have grabbed the attention of readers both for and
against the measure.

The terror of the Inquisition combined

with the more recent hysteria over the Quebec Act, and the
fear it generated for its supposed support of "popery,"
divulged Madison's deep concern about the bill.

If any

tyrant rivaled King George in the colonists mind, it was the
Catholic Church.

Madison painted a picture designed to

shock in order to expose the threat present.
Was Madison guilty of using scare tactics?
but the threat seemed real to him.

Perhaps,

He studied history and

had lived through the events that sparked Revolution.
Moreover, he matured as an adult and began his political
career at a time when Whig ideology, characterized by a
paranoid fear of tyranny, corruption, and conspiracy, held
sway over many Americans.

Madison, moreover, had picked the

right time to act like a paranoid Whig.

Irving Brant has

remarked that "Memorial and Remonstrance" was Madison's
greatest contribution to religious liberty.

According to

Brant, Madison looked beyond a "seemingly trivial levy in
aid of religious teachers, and saw its ultimate consequence

26
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in the denial of liberty and imposition of clerical control
upon the state." 27

A true Whig in this respect, Madison

judged the legislation not only by its immediate impact, but
also by its ends, asking how it endangered liberty.
The fear of conspiratorial plots against liberty never
left Madison's mind.

Not surprisingly, during the bitter

party feuds of the 1790s, one finds Madison describing the
Federalists as "Anglicans. " 28

He reminded his readers

which party carried the ideals of the Revolution, the
Jeffersonians.

"They have maintained ... a deep conviction of

the danger to liberty and Constitution ... and have sometimes
been reprehended in debate for an excess of caution and
jealousy." 29

The diligent guard needed to uncover new

plots against liberty should never be relaxed.

Americans,

who had the good fortune to possess the "inestimatable
blessing of a free and defined constitution cannot be too
watchful, nor too critical in tracing the consequences of
new principles ... that may remove the landmarks of power. " 30
The fear of tyranny via religious bodies also remained
uppermost in Madison's mind.
27

While he understood that
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corruption of political power could appear at any time, he
also held that too little political authority proved as
great a vice as too much. 31

With regard to religion,

however, he never changed.

While some political power was

necessary for popular government, religion to his mind
should never gain coercive power.
.Monopolies, " 32

In his "Essay on

Madison reiterated his belief in keeping

religious bodies from any kind of political power and
maintaining a diligent watch for the first signs of tyranny.
Referring again to the Tea Act of 1773, Madison maintained
that Americans "owe their independence and their liberty to
the wisdom of descrying in the minute tax of three pence on
tea, the magnitude of the evil comprised in the precedent."
The threat of tyranny would always exist, and citizens would
be wise to guard "against silent accumulations and
encroachments by ecclesiastical bodies."

Madison then

emphasized that examples of such encroachment "may be
illustrated by precedents already furnished in their [the
United States] short history." 33

Failure to keep religion
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out of government destroyed the "great barrier" that kept
spiritual tyranny shackled.

Crevices would appear, "through

which bigotry may introduce persecution; a monster that
feeding and thriving on its own venom gradually swells to a
size and strength overwhelming all laws divine & human." 34
A vivid picture of tyranny, complete tyranny, Madison
painted once more.

Although known for his reserved manner,

the subject of tyranny led him to reveal his inner emotions
more deeply than any other.
In his opposition to ecclesiastical establishment
Madison showed that protection of conscience required, for
him, republican vigilance.

Republican doctrine stressed the

endless diligence of citizens watching for acts that usurped
power or created dangerous tendencies that led to
subjugation.

This fear of tyranny bordered on obsession for

some Radical Whigs.

Madison, in this respect, stands fully

in the classical tradition.

Whatever inconsistencies may be

found in Madison in other regards, there was none in his
fear of, and opposition to political and religious
oppression.
Madison's fear of tyranny revealed one aspect of his
classical philosophy, that of Radical Whiggery; yet in a
different way so does his view of the Senate.

The

ideological influence that shaped his perception of the

34
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Senate did not draw on English Opposition thought.

Madison

regarded the Senate as the bastion of wisdom, stability,
reason, and virtue.

In this sense he drew on Montesquieu as

well as Enlightenment philosophy which stressed the role of
reason.
Pluralist scholars, and more generally, historians who
.employ the liberal paradigm to describe the founding periods
tend to view the Constitution and James Madison as
instrumental in destroying the need for virtue in republican
government.

According to this line of reasoning, Madison's

genius existed in constructing a popular government that
thrived in a society dominated by interests.

Virtue had no

place in the new government, and Madison's mentioning, in
one letter, of the need for virtue, one historian has passed
off as a "moment of anxiety.
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Gary Wills, however, has correctly pointed out that
this kind of reading is much too selective. 36

Any

interpretation that paints Madison as discounting the need
for virtue fails to consider the values and roles he
assigned to the Senate.

Like Montesquieu,

Madison saw the

need for virtue in government.
Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws, considered it a
35

John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics:
Virtue, Self Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism,
68.
36

Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist, (New
York: Penguin Books, 1981), 189. Wills refered, in this
instance, to Robert Dahl's Deadlock of Democracy.
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maxim of republican government that the divisions of land
should be equal and small. 37

The theorist realized,

however, "an equal division of lands cannot be established
in all democracies."

Circumstances would arise which would

make an equal division of land impracticable, dangerous,
"and even subversive of the constitution."

"If it appears

that this division of lands, which was designed to preserve
the people's morals, does not suit the democracy, recourse
must be made to other methods. " 38

Montesquieu solved this

difficult question by recommending the creation of a Senate.
The great theorist saw the Senate as a permanent body "to
which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent service procure
admittance. " 39

Because of their concern for the public

good, Senators would provide a role model for citizens, and
inspire the sentiments of virtue within the citizens.
Because of the admirable qualities and stability they gave
to government, Montesquieu advocated electing Senators for
life. 40
While Madison rejected Montesquieu's theories about
republics existing in small areas and consisting of a
homogenous population, his understanding of the Senate's
role paralleled the French thinker's in important ways.
37

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1:2:6:45.

38

Ibid. , 1 : 2 : 7 : 4 7 .

39

Ibid. , 1 : 2 : 7 : 4 7 .

40

Ibid. , 1 : 2 : 7 : 4 8 .
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First he expounded on Montesquieu's idea that an equal
division of property was not possible in some popular
governments.

Madison believed such a division impossible;

indeed the most "common and durable source of factions has
been the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of
property.
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The distinctive feature of the Senate,

however, stemmed from its ability to proceed "with more
coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom ... " 42

In

a society prone to faction, a wise and virtuous Senate
advanced the public good. 43
41

The Federalist Papers, (New York: Mentor Books,
1961), 10: 19. This method refers to the appropriate number
and page.
42

James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), 83.
Hereafter cited as Notes.
43

See Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the
American Constitution (Washington D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Inc, 1986), 121. Riemer sees the importance of
the Senate in Madison's thought, but does not trace the
possible ideological influences or elaborate in much detail
on the subject. Jack Rakove's "Madisonian Moment,"
University of Chicago Law Review, 55.2 (Spring 1988): 473505, also points to Madison describing the Senate advancing
the public good. However, Rakove feels the ideological
origins of such thoughts are Burkean. Ibid., 483.
I find no
evidence in Madison's writings to support such a theory.
The case for Montesquieu seems more plausible to me.
During
his preparatory schooling under Donald Robertson before
entering Princeton, Madison had access to Montesquieu's
Spirit of the Laws, and probably gained his initial
acquaintance with the author there.
See JM, Editorial Note,
1:5, and Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:59. While at
Princeton, Madison also came into contact with Montesquieu.
President John Witherspoon used The Spirit of the Laws as a
textbook. See Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:76.
In
addition, Burke is mentioned only once in Madison's
writings, and that occurred when Madison, as part of a
Congressional Committee to compile a bibliography for a

44
In 1785, Madison responded to a letter from Caleb
Wallace asking for help in forming the constitution for the
future state of Kentucky.

Madison's first words of advice

dealt with the Legislative branch and the importance of the
Senate.

"By all means" one should include "a Senate

constituted on such principles as will give wisdom and
steadiness to legislation.
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The Senate must watch over

the "aggregate interests" of the entire community.
Madison's belief that a properly constituted Senate would
act for the common good was so strong he originally
suggested that the veto power over the state legislatures be
lodged in the Senate, not the executive. 45

Can it be

coincidence that the last words of Madison-Publius concerned
the Senate?

Madison argued in Federalist 63 that the

utility and authority of the Senate would stem from "such a
display of enlightened policy and attachment to the public
good, as will divide that branch of [the] legislature the
affections and support of the entire body of the people. " 46
Like Montesquieu, Madison believed that the Senate's actions
possible library for Congress, cited Burke's Annual
Register. When Madison specified men of authority, only
Locke appeared above Montesquieu in the number of times
cited. No one else is cited even half as many times as
these two.
44

JM
_,

Madison to Caleb Wallace, 23 August 1785, 8:350.

45

See JM, Madison to Edmund Randolph, 7 April 1787,
9:370, and Madison to George Washington, 16 April 1787,
9:384.
46

The Federalist Papers, 63: 390.
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would command the people's respect, and thus foster virtue
within the people by example.
The need for a disinterested body devoted to the public
good originated in Madison's mind in the 1780s when he
served in both the Continental Congress and Virginia House
of Delegates.

Madison despised the overriding concern with

local interests when trying to legislate for the entire
nation.

Before the Constitutional Convention he confided to

Edmund Randolph that he hoped local prejudices would have no
place in the formation of the new government. 47

The Jay-

Gardoqui talks of 1786 had impressed Madison for their lack
of "just and extended maxims of policy," which promoted the
prosperity of the Union, and the "predominance of temporary
and partial interests" which attempted to give up the right
of navigation on the Mississippi. 48

State representatives,

furthermore, frequently displayed the character of partisans
for their respective states rather than "impartial guardians
of a common interest.
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Particularly singled out for

criticism by Madison were supporters of paper money schemes.
Such men seemed unconcerned with the long term effects of
legislative measures.

"Is it to be imagined that an

ordinary citizen or even assemblyman of Rhode Island in

47

JM, Madison to Edmund Randolph, 8 April 1787, 8:369.

48

Ibid., Madison to James Monroe, 5 October 1786,

9:141.
49

The Federalist Papers, 46: 296-297.
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estimating the policy of paper money ever considered or
cared, in what light the measure would be viewed in France
or Holland; or even in Massachusetts or Connecticut." 50
The need for an enlightened body was clear to Madison.

The

question was how to construct a Senate so that cosmopolitan,
dispassionate legislators capable of "discerning the true
.public good" won election. 51
An effective remedy for removing men of narrow or local
prejudices consisted of "process of elections as will most
certainly extract from the mass of society the purest and
noblest characters. " 52

Madison favored picking Senators by

the people at large, or by the creation of large interstate
districts. 53

Such a method made it difficult "for unworthy

candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by
which elections are too often carried." 54

The larger the

district, the more interests within that district, the less
50

Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder,
"Vices of
the Political System of the United States," April 1787, 90.
51

Jack Rakove, "Madisonian Moment," 482.

52

Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Vices of
the Political System of the United States," April 1787, 91.
53

In the Virginia Plan, Madison originally called for
the election of Senators by the House.
However, once the
convention began he quickly shifted to favor election by the
people at large or by large interstate districts. Either he
had not convinced himself of the efficacy of such a plan, or
the idea was not Madison's originally. Brant felt Madison
switched his position because election by the people would
give Senators more independence.
See Irving Brant, James
Madison, 3:80.
54

The Federalist Papers, 10:82.

47
chance there was of an elected official representing one
interest winning election.ss

Election by district

increased the odds that local, demagogic Senators would gain
off ice and pursue only the narrow interests of the
constituency they represented.

They lost sight of the

aggregate good of the community.

Madison, therefore,

criticized Jefferson's "Notes on Virginia" in 1788 for
advocating election of Senators by district.s 6

To impress

upon Senators the need to focus their attention on the
general interests of all, Madison felt a process of
elections in which the entire citizenry of the state voted
for their Senators proved best.s 7
In this vein Jack Rakove has argued that Madison's
ideal Senate was to be elected by constituencies
sufficiently large to erase any degree of electoral
accountability.ss

While Rakove exaggerated in saying

Madison wanted Senators to be free of accountability, he
touched on an aspect of the Senate Madison thought
important, a method of election designed to pick virtuous
men, who also had a measure of independence accorded them in
ss See The Federalist Papers, 10:83, for a concise
summary of Madison's theory of representation.
s 6 Robert J. Morgan, "Madison's Theory of
Representation in the Tenth Federalist," Journal of
Politics, 36.4 (1974): 852-888, 863.
s7 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Critique of
Jefferson's Notes on Virginia," October 1788, 57.
ss Jack Rakove, "Madisonian Moment," 482.
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order to promote the public good.
Independence for Senators meant they could act as
disinterested legislators.

Madison confided to Edmund

Pendleton in October, 1788, that some degree of impartiality
must exist in even despotic governments.

In Republics,

however, impartiality "may be considered as the vital
.Principle of the Administration. " 59
exercising independent judgment.

Impartiality meant

It seems ironic, then,

that Madison failed to get elected to the Senate because he
possessed the very trait he expected members of the upper
House to exhibit.

Patrick Henry, still smarting from his

defeat in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, kept
Madison out of the Senate by spreading the rumors that
Madison would not obey state legislative instructions. 60
To Madison longer terms for Senators contributed to
their freedom of action, but more importantly they furnished
59

JM, Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 20 October 1788,

11:306.
60

JM, George Lee Turberville to James Madison, 10
November 1788, 11:339. Madison was well aware that Henry's
influence would keep him out of the Senate.
In a November
2, 1788, letter to Edmund Randolph, Madison tells Randolph
he would prefer to serve in the House. The Senate was out
of the question due to Henry's dislike of him.
JM, 11:329.
Henry, however, had good reason to make such accusations of
Madison.
In 1783 Virginia had withdrawn its support of the
five percent impost bill. Madison, then serving in the
Continental Congress, continued to support the measure.
While torn by his decision, Madison felt, ultimately, his
allegiance to the public good and his own conscience must
overcome his fidelity to Virginia. He would risk his
political career to stand for a measure he felt essential to
the welfare of the nation. JM, Notes on Debates, 28 January
1783, 147.
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the means to consider long term national goals.

Six year

terms, he observed, permitted the Senate to enact measures
"which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation."
Such measures were critical, in Madison's mind, for the
general welfare of any society.

The House, by contrast,

consisted of members elected for terms so short that they
proved "unable to provide more than one or two links in a
chain of measures, on which the general welfare may
essentially depend." 61

Longer terms provided continuity to

legislation some continuity, and also pointed to a feature
of the Senate that Madison felt America needed most,
stability.
By 1787 Madison felt that the colonies stood on the
brink of dissolution.

Inadequate government financing,

paper money schemes, inter-state commercial struggles, and
Shays' Rebellion, fueled Madison's concern for the state of
the Union. 62
criticism.

Even Congress came in for its share of
In 1783 he watched with distaste the antics of

new Congressmen in a minor debate over consular power.

In

the end nothing was resolved, which caused Madison to write
that experience "constantly teaches" that new members of a
public body failed to act with the proper respect towards

61

62

The Federalist Papers, 63:383.

For a good discussion on Madison's fear of disunion,
consult the third chapter of Neal Riemer's James Madison:
Creating the American Constitution.
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the acts of their predecessors.

Members had not studied the

issues or become acquainted with present circumstances, a
grievous sin in Madison's eyes. 63

He concluded that a

change of legislative "members & circumstances often proves
fatal to the consistency and stability of public
measures. " 64

In an insightful exchange of letters with

Philip Mazzei in 1788, Madison defended the Constitution
because it supplied steadiness.

Stunned by Mazzei's

implication in an earlier letter that his support of the
Constitution was anti-republican,

Madison fired back that

"experience has proved that the real danger to America &
liberty lies in the defect of energy and stability in the
present establishments of the United States." 65

Obviously,

then, by the time of the Constitutional Convention Madison
thought it vital "that a stable and firm Government,

63

Madison, by contrast, during his first six months in
Congress made no motions and ''probably never entered a
debate.'' Lance Banning, "James Madison and the
Nationalists," William and Mary Quarterly, 40.2 (April
1983), 230. Madison's reason for keeping such a low profile
probably stemmed from his natural shyness, weak voice, and
his tendency not to enter into a fracas until he had
prepared himself adequately.
64

JM, Notes, 6 January 1783, 6:16. Madison reiterated
these same thoughts in The Federalist Papers, 62:188.
65

JM, Madison to Philip Mazzei, 8 October 1788,
11:278. Madison went on in his letter to say that he
understood why Mazzei felt as he did.
The Frenchman labored
under a system in which there was too much government, while
the opposite had proved true for Madison. Madison concluded
by saying that both he and Mazzei would feel differently if
each exchanged places with the other.
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organized in the republican form," be constructed. 66
The Upper House provided Madison the governmental
stability he sought.

"The Senate was to commonwealth what

ballast is to a ship. " 67

"One great end" of the Senate

was, "that being a firm, wise, and impartial body," it would
give "stability to the General Government in its operation
on individuals. " 68

By giving "that stability which was

called for everywhere," Americans could rebuke "Enemies of
the Republican form," who alleged that steadiness in
government was contrary to the nature of republicanism. 69
Not surprisingly, then, Madison advocated long terms for
Senators.

He hinted that even a nine year term might not

prove too long and supported seven years with some
reservations.

Madison worried that a seven year term for

Senators would still leave that branch impotent in the face
of the more numerous House. 70
A chronic worrier, Madison obviously overreacted to the
lack of stability in America.

In this instance, his

determination to endow the Senate with stability drew him
away from the suppositions of Radical Whiggery, which
66

James Madison, Notes, 12 June 1787, 110.

67

Alexander Hamilton, Pay Book of the State Company of
Artillery, 1777. Quoted in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of
the American Republic, 1776-1787, 210.
68

James Madison, Notes, 26 June 1787, 199.

69

Ibid., 12 June 1787, 110-111.
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Irving Brant, James Madison, 3:48.
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stressed rotation in office and short terms in order to
guarantee the renewal of virtue. 71

In this sense he looked

to the other, Montesquieuian, side of classical
republicanism.

Madison, like Montesquieu, required the

presence of a wise and virtuous Senate to balance both
government and community.
If virtue and stability emanated from the second house
of the legislative body, Madison expected one more quality
to characterize the Senate's action.
not enough.

Virtue by itself was

Madison was a philosopher, as Adrienne Koch has

put it, "perhaps the best this nation has ever produced." 72
Living in the era of the American Enlightenment, Madison
looked to the Senate to provide reason and systematic study
of legislation.

Virtue and stability had to be tied to the

means best capable of achieving them, wisdom.
As the stronghold of reason the Senate could offer
guidance that both the people and government, at times,
lacked.

Although the American people "are an enlightened

and liberal people ... they are not all philosophers." 73
Gary Wills has also pointed out that Madison accepted the
distinctions between heart and head, which appeared in The

71

J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 519.

72

Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison: The Great
Collaboration (London: Oxford University Press, 1973,
reprint of 1950 edition by Alfred A. Knopf), 291.
73
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JM, Madison to Philip Mazzei, 8 October 1788,
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Federalist. 74

State legislatures, had, at times, good

intentions, but failed to convert them into coherent
policies.

Good government meant devotion to the public

good, but also to "a knowledge by which that object [the
public good] can be best attained."

Americans, according to

Madison had paid "too little attention" to this important
.Principle. 75
Madison's language revealed constantly the necessity of
linking virtue and wisdom.

Whenever Madison talked about

the Senate, usually wisdom or some other synonym for it
appears first.

Use of reason, however, also consisted of

proceeding in a detached, scientific manner.

Madison, then,

described members of the upper house as acting with "more
coolness and system" to him the Senate was a "temperate and
respectable" body. 76

Led by no permanent interest,

Senators could devote themselves to the study of law and
"the affairs and comprehensive interests of their
country.

1177

government,

Dedicated to securing reason a place in
Madison's thought did not differ from the

prominent ideological understanding of human powers of his
time.

While rationality was supposed to reign supreme over

74

Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist, 186.

75

The Federalist Papers, 62:187.

76

James Madison, Notes, 7 June 1787, 83, and The
Federalist Papers, 63:384.
77

The Federalist Papers, 62:379.
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the passions, self interest led men to act in ways contrary
to reason. 79

Naturally, Madison looked favorably on that

institution which subjugated interest to reason.
Madison favored, therefore, Senatorial appointment of
judges because that body would use their "deliberate
judgement." 79

Both in the Constitutional Convention and

The Federalist, Madison pointed to the salutary check the
Senate could impose on "impetuous" legislation and the rash
acts of the people. 80

As he noted in The Federalist, the

Senate would "suspend the blow the people aimed at
themselves until reason,
authority."

justice, and truth can retain

Their deliberate manner would allow them to

"escape a variety of errors in the exercise of the
legislative trust." 91

Also significant for Madison was the

Senate's ability to throw their weight to the side of
justice to prevent the majority from endangering the
fundamental rights of minorities. 92

Finally the Senate was

to serve as a watchdog over government.

It was to guard

78

Daniel W. Howe, "The Political Psychology of The
Federalist," William and Mary Quarterly, 44.3, (July 1987):
485-509, 487-491.
79

James Madison, Notes, 5 June 1787, 68.
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The Federalist Papers, 63:383-384. See also James
Madison, Notes, 26 June 1787, 193.
82

James Madison, Notes, 26 June 1787, 194-195.
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against governmental tyranny. 83

The Senate, then, enhanced

the common interest of all by acting deliberately, and by
ensuring the legislative process remained true to the
principles of justice.
Such was Madison's theoretical picture of the Senate,
stable, dedicated to the public good, and possessing the
intellectual qualities necessary for discerning and acting
to promote the aggregate good of all.

However, much to

Madison's chagrin, the Senate's actions under the
Constitution showed quickly that it could act in an
unvirtuous manner, yet he held fast to his original
conception of that body.
This became apparent to Madison in 1789, as took part
in the debate over the proper titles for the President and
Vice-President that Senator (and former Anti-Federalist)
Richard Henry Lee initiated in the upper body's first
session.

Madison recoiled against the pompous titles Lee

favored.

They diminished the "true dignity" of both

Washington and republican government. 84

A similar

controversy recurred in 1790 when the Senate considered a

83

For a concise and persuasive article on the Senate's
utility as a check against governmental tyranny, consult
George Carey, "Separation of Powers & the Madisonian Model:
A Reply to the Critics," American Political Science Review,
72 (March 1978): 151-164.
84

James Madison, Congressional Speech, quoted in
Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison, 102.
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bill which attached the title of "honorable" to Senators. 85
Here, Madison believed, the Senate threatened to inflict "a
deep wound to our infant government." 86

Madison had to

endure more actions he thought betrayed the essence of that
institution.

The Senate was directly responsible for twice

defeating his bills of commercial discrimination in 1789 and
1794, measures whose passage Madison considered critical to
the welfare of the nation.

The Senate, furthermore,

originated the hated Bank bill and passed the bill on
Assumption.

Yet despite the empirical evidence that spoke

to the contrary, and the fact that locally oriented state
legislators elected Senators, Madison continued to hold to
his original theoretical conception of the Upper House. 87
The persistence of Madison's conception of the Senate
as the vessel of virtue is evident from his acts during the
first year of the new government.

In the fight over pay

differentiation between Senate and House during the first
85

JM, Madison to William Short, 6 April 1790, 11:140.

86

James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 9 May 1789,
quoted in Irving Brant's James Madison, 3:256.
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The evidence in the next paragraph of the text
contradicts Rakove's assertion that with the election of
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See Jack Rakove's ''Madisonian Moment," 484.
For an opinion
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session of Congress in 1789, Madison supported paying the
former a slightly higher salary.

He supported this hopeless

motion, moreover, during his time as a member of the House.
A difference in pay, Madison reminded House members during a
July 1789 speech, would recruit for the Senate "men of
abilities and firm principles."

Such men needed prompting

so that they may be "induced to devote the experience of
years, and the acquisitions of study, to the service of
their country.

1188

Madison re-iterated these same thoughts

in a letter to Wilson Cary Nicholaus.

Pay discrimination

needed to become a reality because the "utility of the
Senate will depend on its being composed of the first
characters." 89

Three years later in 1792, amidst bitter

political feuding, Madison found himself attacked in an
anonymous pamphlet for his support of the pay discrimination
between House and Senate members.

Irritated, he replied in

"Notes on Politics & Views" that rewards for public service
should be in proportion to the private sacrifices.

No man,

Madison maintained, should hang his head over supporting pay
discrimination.

"The utility of the Senate will depend on

the respectability of its characters. 119 °

Four years after

passage of the Constitution, and now finding himself firmly
88

JM, Congressional Speech, 16 July 1789, 12:293.

89

Ibid., Madison to Wilson Cary Nicholaus, 18 June
1789, 12:295. Emphasis in the original.
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Ibid., Notes on Politics & Views, 4 November 1792,
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allied with Jefferson, Madison still clung to his vision of
a respectable, educated, and experienced Senate advancing
the public interest.
Madison's stubborn insistence that wise and virtuous
men existed and would make their way into the Senate was
echoed by many other revolutionaries versed in classical
theory.

These men were confident there existed in the

community a "senatorial part," a natural and intellectual
elite that could govern in the interests of all. 91

The

idea that Madison discarded classical ideology with its
emphasis on virtue fails as soon as one starts to examine
his views on government.

Virtue and wisdom were the

fundamental qualities Madison prescribed for a united and
stable United States.

While the mass of society could not

always be expected to act virtuously, Madison, like
Montesquieu, clearly expected the Senate to behave in a
manner that demonstrated its devotion to the public good.
Yet if Madison imparted a classical understanding of
the need for virtue in government, he also displayed a
radical Whig mentality which stressed the importance of
republican jealousy.

This paranoid mentality, frequently

concerned with threats to liberty both religious and
governmental, formed an essential part of Madison's
ideological character.

91

Diligent attention, he believed

Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic;
1776-1787, 209.
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fervently, must be paid to government's action in order to
spot early signs of tyrannical corruption.

Once detected,

citizens must stifle such tendencies at their advent. Such
qualities seemed necessary in Madison's eyes for the
Republic's preservation.

To overlook or discount the

classical Madison is to miss an important aspect of his
thought.

CHAPTER III
THE LIBERAL MADISON: NATURAL RIGHTS AND INTEREST

The importance of republican ideology in Madison's
thought has now gained legitimacy in historiographical
circles, due in large part to the diligence of Lance Banning
and Drew McCoy.

Similarly, Stephen Watts' recent study on

liberalism and republicanism in the early republic depicts
Madison "as an ideological shaper of Jeffersonian
Republicanism." 1

Yet to describe Madison solely through

republican eyes misses the liberal aspect of his thought.
Radical Whig and Montesquieuian republicanism can be
described as Madison's means to protect the republic, but
Lockean principles constituted his end.

Republican

principles and institutions were, for Madison, guardians of
natural rights.

Thus, as important as his republican

principles were, alone they do not fully capture his
thought.
mind.

Equally important was the liberal side of Madison'

Although the subject of considerable study, the

liberal Madison remains misunderstood.
Conventional liberal interpretations search for
Madison's liberal principles in The Federalist.
1

His

Stephen Watts, The Republic Reborn: War in the Making
of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University, 1987), 311.

61
masterful extended republic theory, found in the tenth
paper, described how the size of the country bred a
multiplicity of interests, which in turn allowed for their
negation, insuring that no interest could arise to control
government. 2

In this regard, Madison-Publius described

interest in a negative way.

Yet Madison's other writings--

indeed a multitude of them--insisted that promotion of
interest was far from evil, showing the skewed and shallow
historical understanding of Madison's theory of interest
needs correction.
Another prominent view of Madison describes him as an
elitist who helped design a system of government to protect
the propertied elite from majority rule.

Scholars such as

John Patrick Diggins are especially critical of Madison's
defense of property and minority rights.

However, a

thorough and broad study of Madison's theories of property
and minority rights discloses that his dedication to such
principles extended far beyond protecting the property of
wealthy Americans.

In fact, his theories in this matter

encompassed a broad range of minority groups outside of the
elite classes.

Madison's defense of property and minority

rights went much further than the preservation of the

2

For an extended analysis of faction and the extended
republic, see Neal Riemer's James Madison: Creating the
American Constitution, chapter five; and Jack Rakove's
"James Madison and the Extended Republic: Theory and
Practice in American Politics," This Constitution, 3 (1984):
16-22.
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colonial social hierarchy.

His defense in this matter

demonstrated a logical application of natural law to civil
society.

For Madison, majority rule was the pivot upon

which republican government turned.

As Drew McCoy has

correctly observed, Madison's "preoccupation with the perils
of majority rule must not be confused with a rejection of
the principle itself." 3

Madison's goals in 1787 and at the

end of his life remained the same, "minimizing the risk of
majority rule without abandoning the cause" of the system
that was "the least flawed," popular government. 4

Yet true

to Lockean doctrine, he maintained that a government based
on majority rule could never violate natural rights.

To

this end, no one worked harder than Madison to secure
individual rights, especially the right of conscience, and
elevate them to the same sacred plane as property.
Furthermore, when Madison put into practice his theory of
protecting minorities, he did not work to promote the upper
classes.

On the contrary, he labored to protect the

nation's religious and social outcasts, Baptists, Catholics,
Quakers and even

Jews.

His theory of minority rights

echoed natural law precepts in many respects and pushed
beyond them in others.
That Madison was as close a student of Locke as he was

3

4

Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 137.

Ibid., 137, and Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the
Founder, "Majority Governments," 530.
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of Montesquieu and other republican thinkers is beyond
question.

He was, in particular, familiar with book two of

Locke's Treatises on Civil Government, where the English
philosopher sketched the development of civil society.
Prior to formation of civil society, Locke held, all men
lived in a state of nature with complete freedom.

The

,Problem with "eden", however, lay in the fact it contained
no security. 5

Problems arose from each man being able to

interpret and act upon the law of nature individually.

Men

acting as "judges in their own case" naturally had the
tendency to act in their own interest. 6
Locke noted that the end of civil society consisted of
remedying the "inconveniences of the state of nature ... by
setting up a known authority to appeal to ... which everyone
of society ought to obey." 7

The social contract, by which

all participants agreed to become part of a society, was for
Locke based on one important principle, the protection of
property.

Locke referred to this idea continually

throughout the Second Treatise and made clear that his
definition of property extended beyond material possession.

5
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York: Doubleday, 1935), 265.
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Civil society, he emphasized, existed to preserve the
people's "lives, liberties and Estates, which I call by the
general name Property." 8
Once the social contract was entered into, all who
joined were to abide by the will of the majority, which was
to exhibit its sovereignty through a legislative body. 9
~hile

the legislature ruled with the "preservation of

society" as its fundamental purpose, the body was limited in
certain respects.

Locke argued that the Legislative power

"cannot take from any man part of his Property without his
consent.

1110

Since the preservation of property comprised

the reason which individuals joined civil society, it seemed
absurd to force them to abandon it.

Such activities

diminished a person's natural freedom, whereby the end of
law "is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and
enlarge freedom." 11

There exists, then, in Lockean theory

an essential tension.

On the one hand, majority rule

provided the foundation of civil society; on the other hand
the authority of the majority could never be used to deprive
a person or persons of their natural rights.
Madison became acquainted with the works of Locke at
an early age.

While attending the boarding school of Donald

8
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Robertson in the 1760s, he had his first contact with
Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding."

Madison's notebook,

"A Brief System of Logick (sic)," contained his lecture
notes from classes at Princeton.

The notebook revealed his

continuing fascination with Locke's "Essay." 12

Madison

made his admiration for Locke clear in a comparison between
Locke and Montesquieu, another man he had held in esteem.
Montesquieu, Madison wrote in 1792, "was in politics not a
Newton or a Locke,

[both] who established immortal systems--

the one in matter, the other in mind." 13

Later in his life

when discussing with Jefferson textbooks for law students at
the University of Virginia, Madison emphasized the need for
Locke's works.

It was important, he held, that the

doctrines of liberty, manifested in American politics, "be
inculcated on those" who would sustain and administer it.
"Sidney and Locke are admirably calculated to impress on
young minds the rights of nations to establish their own
government, and to inspire a love of free ones." 14
12

Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:58-59, and JM,
Editorial Notes on a "Brief System of Logick," 32-35.
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Madison's affinity for Lockean principles manifested
itself in his constant references to natural law.
Commenting to Edmund Randolph about the impact of the
American Revolution abroad, he stated that all of Europe
would slowly "be roused to the recollection and assertion of
the rights of human nature."

In a 1785 letter to Lafayette,

he maintained that the Spanish government would fail in its
attempt to permanently close the Mississippi to American
navigation for "nature seems on all sides to be reasserting
those rights which have so long been trampled on by bigotry
and tyranny." 15

In a 1793 letter, accepting an offer of

French citizenship from the revolutionary government,
Madison wrote that he was grateful to have played a role in
"reclaiming the lost rights of mankind." 16
Madison also articulated other Lockean doctrines. In
Federalist 43, he appealed to natural law and the consent of
the governed as justification for the Constitutional
Convention.

In the third essay of his Helvidius series, he

maintained the efficacy of revolution, peaceful or by
bloodshed.

"Every nation," he argued, "has the right to

abolish an old government and establish a new one." 17

One

can also find Madison lecturing on aspects of the social

15
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contract in Continental Congress debates over Kentucky
statehood and in the Constitutional Convention during
discussion of the New Jersey Plan. 18
Yet an exchange of letters with Jefferson over the
former's doctrine of "the earth belongs to the living" best
showed how closely Madison had read Locke.

In this instance

he displayed his knowledge of the Second Treatise to be
greater than that of his radical friend.

Jefferson argued

that no generation should be bound by the debts or laws of
preceding generations.

Natural law presupposed that all

have a part in forming the society in which they live.
must give their express consent.

All

Madison refuted one part

of his friend's idea, arguing that current generations are
bound to the past by the improvements or sacrifices their
predecessors had made.

Madison, moreover, saw Jefferson's

scheme as very impractical, a vessel of chaos. 19

In a

philosophic manner, he deflated Jefferson's appeal to
natural law by arguing that people agree to a government and
Constitution by giving a tacit assent to the country's laws
and political structure. 20

"Tacit assent ... is to be

18

See Ibid., Constitutional Convention Speech, 19 June
1787, 10:55, Congressional Speech, 27 August 1782, 5:83
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20
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inferred from the omission of express revocation. " 21

In

this regard Madison echoed Locke, for the English
philosopher had anticipated that someone might take his
theory of natural law to argue that the laws and government
of civil society could not bind those who, for a variety of
reasons, were not present during the formation of the social
contract.

The Second Treatise states:

The difficulty is, what ought to be look'd upon as
a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how
far anyone shall be looked on to have consented,
and thereby submitted to any government, where he
has made no Expressions of it at all. And to this
I say, that every Man, that hath any possession,
or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any
Government, doth thereby gives his tacit consent,
and is as far forth obliged to obedience of the
laws of that government. 22
Locke, like Madison, held to a theory of tacit consent,
which prudently imparted to society a measure of social
stability.
It seems clear that Madison knew Locke's works
intimately.

One scholar has noted that with some

reservations, "Locke was indeed the prime source" of
Madison's principles. 23

However, critics of Madison such

as Charles Beard, James McGregor Burns, Robert Dahl and John
Patrick Diggins, have thought differently.

They point to

21
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22
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23
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Madison's constitutional structure of elaborate checks and
balances, "auxiliary precautions," and the extended republic
argument as evidence of his desire to thwart majority rule.
Viewing Madison through contemporary eyes, Beardian
pluralists have described Madisonian politics as a system in
which political authority is divorced from economic power,
and where majorities cannot directly exert their will.

Much

of this criticism is valid, viewed in today's context, but
by the same token this line of reasoning fails to assess
accurately what Madison had in mind.

These critics portray

Madison as concerned, above all, with protecting property,
in particular the privileged economic status of the upper
class.

Diggins argues that "Madison feared a 'common

motive,' the same 'passion' and 'interest'

(the right of

property) taking hold of a dominant faction as desirous of
possessing property as the minority is of preserving it." 24
To prevent occurrence of such an event, and to also protect
the property of the elite, "the liberty of the majority"
must be frustrated so its will was not expressed
directly. 25
It is doubtless that Madison was a staunch supporter of
property.

As Edward McNall Burns has noted, property was

24

John Patrick Diggins, "Power and Authority in
American Politics," American Historical Review, 86.4
(October 1981), 701-730, 710.
25

Ibid., 710.
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almost an obsession with him. 26

Federalist 10 remains a

poignant reminder of Madison's adherence to property
protection.

Protection of the diverse faculties of man from

which the rights of property originate, he insisted, "is the
first object of government. " 27

In Federalist 54, Madison

reminded his readers that "government is instituted no less
for protection of property than of the person of
individuals." 28

In the Constitutional Convention, he

warned of a "leveling spirit" which might lead to agrarian
laws infringing on the rights of property. 29

He also

fought stay laws and legislation that "impugned the sanctity
of contracts," both of which aided the wealthy. 30
According to Diggins, the text of The Federalist
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advocated an idea of property contrary to the revolutionary
tradition.

Ideas about property revealed in the

Declaration, Diggins insists, are replaced in the
Constitution with new theories.

Diggins explains this shift

in terms of an embrace of (David) Humean concepts, in
particular his stress upon a person's right to use
.government to exclude others from obtaining wealth.

This

view of property, Diggins argues, replaced Locke's theory
which stressed every person's right to property.

In Diggins

view, the Constitution abolished the broad definition of
property that incorporated life and liberty, as well as
estates.

In its stead, he asserts the authors of The

Federalist reduced property to economic pursuits. 31

In the

specific case of Madison, Diggins argues that he rested
property not on a specific value of labor whereby man
"wrests" things out of their natural condition which imparts
value into the object, but on vague "faculties" of acquiring
it, which in a Humean sense "could mean anything from skill
to steal th.

11

32

Drawing heavily on the Federalist for evidence,
however, distorts Madison's view of property.

While Madison

was an ardent defender of the rights of property, he did not
collaborate solely with the "haves" against the "have nots."
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Furthermore, Madison did view property in the Lockean sense,
despite Diggins assertions to the contrary.

A study of his

private and public writings over an expanded time period
exposes the lopsided nature of interpretations by Diggins,
Dahl and others who rely solely on the Federalist.
It was James Madison in the early 1780s who stubbornly
.fought during the western land controversy to eliminate the
claims of land speculating companies to tracts of land
beyond the Appalachians.

Although the ownership of such

companies rested mainly in elite hands, Madison fought their
claims because a magnificent gem--the public domain--would
pass "from the public to a few land mongers. " 33

The idea

of gaining wealth other than through labor appalled Madison.
A view of his political economy, influenced by both
republican and liberal ideas, contradicts the idea he
approved of acquiring property by "stealth." 34

Madison

looked to farmers as the bulwark of the republic. 35
Similarly, his desire to discriminate between original and
current holders of government bonds revealed his distaste
for stockjobbers.

Madison's contempt for legislators who

bought stock in the First Bank of the United States further

33
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revealed his lack of respect for anyone who gained wealth in
such an "underhanded manner."

"Of all shameful

circumstances of this business," he insisted:
it is among the greatest to see the members of the
Legislature who were most active in pushing this
Jobb [sic], openly grasping its emoluments .... The
stockjobbers will become the praetorian band of
the Government-at once its tool & its tyrant ... 36
In Lockean terms, Madison had no respect for those who
earned money in such an unnatural manner.
Furthermore, Madison never held to a narrow economic
definition of property.

He equated liberty with property,

and often linked the terms together.

During the Revolution,

he reported to Edmund Randolph the effects of the rebellion
abroad.

Ireland, he asserted, had reaped the benefits of

American resistance.

"The shackles are taken off the poor

Catholicks [sic] in the articles of religious worship and
the tenure of real property." 37

While the Irish had gained

other benefits, he focused on the natural rights attained,
freedom of property and freedom of conscience.

Madison also

reminded Congress in 1789, as he initiated the Bill of
Rights legislation, that government was instituted for the
benefit of the people.

Such benefits consisted of "the

enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring
and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining
36
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happiness and safety." 38

Edward McNall Burns, by no means

a defender of Madison, has admitted that "in good Lockean
fashion he [Madison] coupled property with liberty as the
great natural rights. " 39
Support for property had more than a material hold on
Madison.

By holding property and other rights as natural,

Madison put them on a pedestal upon which he hoped to hoist
freedom of conscience.

Understanding the depth to which

Americans were committed to natural rights, Madison knew if
conscience could be considered a natural right it therefore
gained the same protection as property and other fundamental
rights.

In this respect, Madison went beyond Locke.

The persecution of Baptists in Virginia in the 1770s
first revealed Madison's affinity for the rights of
conscience.

In 1774 he confided to Pennsylvanian William

Bradford that Virginia lacked that "liberal, catholic, and
equitable way of thinking," which characterized Bradford's
province. 40

Possessed of the right of conscience, the free

Pennsylvanian people, Madison believed, had produced
material as well as spiritual benefits for that state.
Commerce and the arts had flourished in this society where
freedom encouraged "continual exertions of genius."
39
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"Industry and Virtue" he remarked, "have been promoted. " 41
Madison had not yet explicitly linked conscience to natural
rights, but he had tied the faculty which produced property-industry--with freedom of thought.
In the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1775,
Madison was a junior member.

Too shy to enter into debates,

he offered only a few suggestions.

In the end his

contribution was but one sentence in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights.

With the help of Patrick Henry,

Madison attempted to insert into the Virginia Declaration of
Rights a provision disestablishing the Anglican Church and
providing for the free exercise of religion.

Henry's

chameleon character caused him to withdraw his sponsorship
when opposition to the amendment materialized.

Madison thus

had to be satisfied with changing the wording of the
Declaration concerning religious freedom.

In place of

toleration Madison suggested "free exercise" of religion.
This change of phraseology, in Madison's mind, "declared
freedom of conscience to be a natural and absolute
right. " 42

This appears to be the first tangible example of

Madison's thought linking natural rights and freedom of

41
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Ibid., 112.

James Madison, "Autobiography" William and Mary
Quarterly, 2.1 (April 1945), 191-209, 199.
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conscience. 43
Madison, in this instance, demonstrated how far apart
his conception of natural rights was from the majority of
Virginians.

Most accepted the idea of toleration, which at

that time meant acceptance of some form of "Christian or
Protestant State. " 44
narrow view.

But Madison went far beyond this

Indeed, on matters of conscience he was closer

to the radicalism of Tom Paine, who held that "toleration is
not the opposite of intolerance, but it is the counterfeit
of it .... The one assumes the right of withholding liberty,
the other of granting. " 45
Madison, then, traveled beyond Locke, whose notion of
religious liberty varied little from the concept of
tolerance for different sects of Christians held by the
majority of Americans. 46

He stretched the doctrine of

natural rights to include freedom of conscience.

While

adhering in letter to natural rights, he also tried to
transcend the limitations imposed on conscience by Locke.
The 1785 establishment controversy in Virginia

43
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provided an example of Madison hoisting conscience onto the
sacred plateau of natural rights.

The key plank of his

"Memorial and Remonstrance" based freedom of conscience on
natural right. 47

Madison deplored establishment because it

infringed on a principle, which "is in its nature an
unalienable right."

Referring to the state's Declaration of

.Rights, Madison maintained that the legislature could not
infringe this right because it was beyond its authority to
encroach on a "fundamental right," which, "if we recur to
its origin, it is the gift of nature." 48

As Rhys Isaac has

noted, Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" is explicitly
contractual.

Madison held that human society was an

association, "in which individuals' rights and obligations
would be regulated by terms on which they entered the
founding compact. " 49

Violation of the social compact in

this matter led the reserved Madison to indicate that he
would support those who disobeyed the establishment law,
should it pass . 50
Madison's role in passage of the Bill of Rights
represented his greatest effort to enshrine the doctrine of
47
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conscience alongside that of property as a "fundamental
right."

Although initially reserved about an addition of a

bill of rights, viewing it as an attempt to fundamentally
change the Constitution, Madison became the force that
carried the bill to its passage.

Charges followed passage

of the Constitution which insinuated Madison had "ceased to
be a friend to conscience," and subsequently led to his
campaign promise to press for a bill of rights. 51

The

notes for his Congressional speech in which he introduced
the Bill of Rights underlines his commitment to natural
rights. 52

It was the only section in the notes that

received such emphasis.

Reinforcement of inalienable rights

was, for Madison, the Bill of Rights' central purpose.

As

he told Congress, the rights that needed protection were
those "which seem to result from the nature of the
compact. " 53

Moreover, Madison's greatest disappointment

with the Bill of Rights stemmed from the striking out of his
own amendment which restricted states from infringing the
rights of conscience, speech, press or right of jury trial.
The loss of this amendment "conceived ... to be the most
valuable on the whole list," restricted the federal
government, but not the states, from invading fundamental
51
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rights.

To Madison the oversight was glaring.s 4
In a 1792 article for the National Gazette, Madison

shifted his attention from merely stating that conscience
was a natural right to proving it.

In "Property" he made

clear his understanding of the relationship between property
and conscience.

The seeds of this relationship (which he

had hinted at in his earlier letter to William Bradford) now
came to full fruition revealing a broad definition of
property very similar to Locke's.ss

The right of

conscience and property were intertwined.

Violation of one

caused desecration of the other.
"Property" is the quintessential piece of Madison's
liberal philosophy.

This essay, like his other works

regarding conscience, was written in the natural law
tradition.s 6

In it he defined property, "in its larger and

juster meaning" as a concept which embraced "everything to
which man may attach a value and have a right, and which
leaves to every one else the like advantage."s 7

Madison

noted that man's property extended beyond tangible things.
"In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his
s 4 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 17 August 1789, 12:344.
ss See note 39 for Madison's letter to Bradford.
s6 Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the American
Constitution, 120.
s7 JM, "Property" 27 March 1792, 14:266.
original.
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rights. " 58

To emphasize the importance of the latter half

of his maxim, Madison characterized conscience as "the most
sacred property of all ... the exercise of that right being a
natural and unalienable right." 59

Government must,

therefore, protect equally conscience and property.

A

government that protects only the right to property, and not
.Property in rights was not just.

As Neal Riemer has argued,

there is no mistake more profound than identifying Madison's
view of property as strictly economic and conservative.
Madison did not see government's role as guarding the
wealthy against the poor.

Property, both the right to and

protection of, deserved security because it was a natural
right. 6 °

Conscience, likewise, deserved the same

protection since it derived from the social compact.

In so

far as the latter has become, at least in public rhetoric, a
principle equal to other natural rights in American society,
it has done so largely through Madison's efforts.
Madison's belief in the protection of natural rights
also led to his firm stance for minority rights.

Classical

republican doctrine stressed suppression of minority rights
for the "sake of the public good. " 61
58
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anathema to Madison.

The doctrine of minority rights is

sprinkled throughout his writings.

Madison's fear of

majority tyranny is most concisely summed up in a letter to
George Washington written shortly before the Constitutional
Convention.

"The majority who alone have the right of

decision have frequently an interest real or supposed in
abusing it." 62

The majority must rule, but majority rule

had boundaries which it could not overstep.

The cure for

such a problem, according to Madison, consisted of founding
a "stable government not infringing fundamental rights. " 63
The Constitution, for the most part, fit Madison's
description.

His concern for minority rights anticipated

Tocqueville's critique of a conformist American society by
forty years.

Yet his doctrine of minority rights is neither

conservative nor aristocratic.

It is simply an affirmation

of Locke's thesis that civil society should never infringe
fundamental rights.

Contrary to pluralist opinion, Madison

was not allied with upper classes in an effort to oppress
the majority.

Indeed, when one analyzes how Madison put his

doctrine of minority rights into practice it is the upper
classes he aligned against.
Madison belonged to the gentry class, but he was not in
solidarity with it.

At the Constitutional Convention, he

62
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opposed property qualifications for elected officials.
There he noted that "landed possessions were no certain
evidence of great wealth."

The unjust laws of the various

states "proceeded more often from this class of men [large
land owners] than any others." 64

Seven years later in

Congressional debates taxation, Madison called for taxes on
luxuries.

Referring his colleagues to the words of Thomas

Paine, Madison described "a great estate" as the greatest
luxury.

65

Madison, furthermore, participated in struggles against
his own class.

As a foremost supporter of the Baptists in

Virginia, he helped deal a blow to gentry dominance in that
state.

Although he professed no affection for Baptist

"enthusiasm," he (and his father)
protection for them on occasion. 66

fought for, and provided
As a vestryman, the

senior Madison enforced church discipline.

One of the

vestryman's most important duties consisted of putting
Baptists in jail for preaching without licenses.

In this

distasteful task James Madison, Sr. refused to take part. 67
Rather than discouraging Baptist activities' like a good
vestryman should have, he tolerated, and even allowed,
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Baptist meetings near his own home.

Indeed, in May of 1771,

four to five thousand Baptists assembled at Blue Run Church
in Orange County.

While this meeting was near the Madisons'

estate, they made no effort to stop it, a passive but bold
statement of the family's support for the Baptists. 68
The younger Madison's service for the Baptists,
however, went far beyond his father's.

As legislator and

pamphleteer Madison's opposition to Episcopal establishment
initiated a fight for freedom of conscience that had broad
social implications.

Rhys Isaac has noted that the

established church composed "an integral part of the fabric
of colonial Virginia society and its system of
authority. " 69

And the Baptist challenge to the elite was

not treated lightly by Virginia gentry.

Establishment had

the support of the cream of Virginia's gentry, among others,
George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee.
Yet, Madison's Lockean principles caused him to fight his
own class and defend the right of an embattled social
minority.

If other members of the gentry knew that the

establishment controversy contained implicit social
implications, Madison doubtless also knew; but he chose to
join those working to break the gentry monopoly on political
power.

The result of this struggle saw the ascendancy of a

68
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84
contractual conception of authority at the expense of the
old social authority of patriarchy in Virginia.

The

principle of individual autonomy began to change "late
eighteenth-century Anglo-Virginians' perceptions of the
world and the expectations they had of it.

1170

Madison

played an important role in this transformation.
His battle for other minorities such as Catholics,
Jews, and Quakers, carried itself into Congress.

In 1790,

Catholics in America numbered approximately thirty five
thousand out of a population just under four million. 71
Persecution had erupted during the Glorious Revolution and
sporadically throughout the eighteenth century wars between
Britain and France, as well as after passage of the Quebec
Act.

Virginia proved one of the worst offenders against

Catholic liberties.

Besides suffering disenfranchisement,

Catholics were prevented from acting as guardians, or
serving as witnesses.

They were barred from settling in

large groups, owning horses worth more than five pounds, or
possessing firearms.

72

Although the Revolutionary alliance

with France helped ease some fears, "socially speaking,
Catholics endured as a suspect minority." 73
70

In 1790,
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Catholics enjoyed civil liberties in only five out of
thirteen states.

The eruption of anti-Catholic prejudices

in the 1840s could not have occurred without Americans being
steeped in the anti-papal tradition. 74
James Madison's support for Catholics, conversely,
stretched back to the 1780s when he served as a member of
the Virginia House of Delegates.

In an unsuccessful bid to

convince the House to amend the Virginia Constitution,
Madison listed as one of the document's defects the
exclusion of "papists and recusants" from the franchise.

75

Later in 1794, when Representative Samuel Dexter of
Massachusetts ridiculed the idea that Roman Catholics could
become attached to republican principles, Madison defended
them.

Catholicism was not inherently anti-republican,

Madison countered.

Pointing to the democratic character of

the Swiss Cantons, many of which were Catholic, he argued
there was nothing inconsistent with their religion and the
"purest republicanism."

Many Catholics had proven

themselves in the recent struggle with England, and thus, he
pointed out, deserved the title of "good citizen. " 76
Madison also championed the rights of Quakers and Jews.
He believed firmly in the rights of conscientious objectors.
74
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In introducing the Bill of Rights, Madison had attached to
the amendment concerning the right to bear firearms a clause
which stated no person religiously opposed to bearing arms
"shall be compelled to render military service in
person." 77

Having failed in this instance, Madison tried

again, in Congressional debates over the militia, to secure
an exemption for Quakers.

He proposed that all persons who

claimed exemption from military duty because of religious
beliefs should present a certificate indicating their church
membership.

Instead of service, Madison proposed that each

would pay a sum of money, although his personal preference
was that the "exemption should be made gratuitous. " 78
Madison's bill again failed to become law, but it provides
another example of his commitment to minority rights.
In 1790 population estimates of Jewish Americans
numbered between 1500 and 2000.

Although American Jews

fared better than their counterparts in Europe, even Rhode
Island, the most liberal of all the colonies, treated them
as strangers, refusing them the right to naturalization. 79
At the time the Constitution was passed, only Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, and Georgia had
77
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repealed onerous civil restrictions on Jews.

Ironically, it

took Maryland, founded as a haven for those religiously
persecuted, twenty seven years of continual referendums on
the "Jew law" to pass it. 8 °

Federalist attacks on

Jeffersonians between 1795 and 1800 appealed at times to
anti-semitic prejudices. 81

Jews, like Catholics, were

victims of deep seated suspicions.
But despite wide spread anti-semitism, American Jews
found a friend in James Madison.

He wrote occasionally to

Jews "expressing his respect for their fortitude and
patriotic attachment to the United States. " 82

As a member

of the Continental Congress Madison at times received
financial aid from Haym Solomon, who refused "obstinately"
all repayment. 83

In 1818, Mordecai M. Noah wrote to

Madison thanking him for his service to the Jews, in
particular his fight for religious freedom.

Madison's

support, Noah testified, was an important reason that he and
other members of his faith had reaped many blessings since

so
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coming to America. 94

With the notable exception of

Indians and blacks, Madison had a deep concern for
minorities existing on the margins of the American society,
and this concern was an important aspect of his liberal
ideology.

Majority rule must always respect the fundamental

rights of all, including socially ostracized groups.
Madison fought for equal rights on behalf of several
minorities, opposing at times his own class.

All must have

an equal right to property, as well as a property in rights.
Madison's opposition to majority rule was hardly
undemocratic.

His doctrine of minority rights posited that

a system of popular government that failed to protect
natural rights was tyranny clothed in a different manner.
While the theory that popular majorities can abuse power has
gained acceptance as a maxim of American political thought,
Madison has received little credit for it.
tyranny wherever he found it.

Madison fought

He feared tyranny of any

kind, whether by the few or the many.

"As Madison never

tired of insisting, the rich could oppress the poor, the
poor could injure the rich, merchants could harm the
farmers, and farmers could damage merchants. " 95

He

championed the individual and his rights to economic,
political, religious, and intellectual freedom.

94

95

The

Ibid., 359.

Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the American
Constitution, 122.
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Constitution, hardly a perfect document to Madison's mind,
attempted to reconcile this tension within Locke's doctrine
between majority rule and individual rights.

Madison

understood that ill use of power, either personal or
political, "could cut many ways." 86

He wanted a system of

government strong enough to govern effectively, but not so
.powerful that it could jeopardize the natural rights of
individuals.
Lockean.

In this regard, it may be that Madison was too

He believed majority rule could exist with

adequate protection for minorities of all classes and
beliefs.

Madison held that a system of popular government

drawing solely on the sovereignty of a heterogenous people,
combined with a diffused balance of power among the various
governmental branches, could govern effectively and secure
fundamental rights. 87

Critics may object to Madison's

methods--that is, his means of securing majority rule with
safety for minorities--but not his end.

If Madison's

theories for joining majority rule with minority rights has
proven archaic in today's world, his goal remains valid.
Any system of rule that stifles or fails to protect
individual development deserves no one's approbation.
Scholars have overlooked the democratic character of
86

87
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For a fairly recent interpretation that argues for
The Federalist's concern for republican government and
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90

Madison's theory of minority rights.

Instead of looking at

his theory in action, they mistakenly derive his doctrine
from class status.

This same type of narrow interpretation

has hampered understanding of another aspect of Madison's
liberal ideology, that which follows from his analyses of
"faction" and "interest".
Madison's theory of interest and faction, as he
developed it in The Federalist, has received considerable
attention from scholars.
two different manners.

It has been viewed in basically
The republican view, that of Gary

Wills and Gordon Wood, maintains that The Federalist's
emphasis on the multiplicity and interplay of interests
allows for the negation of interests to the end of promoting
the public good.BB

In contrast, pluralists such as Laski,

Bentley, Lippman and others, while acknowledging Madison's
dark view of interest and faction, contend that the
structure of government and politics he espoused was
essentially modern.B 9

Publius-Madison, they held,

recognized the interest-oriented nature of man and
championed a republican system in which government provided
the arena for competing interests to vie for ascendancy.
Thus one school sees Madison conceiving government's role as

BB The best example is Garry Wills' Explaining
American: The Federalist.
B9 See Paul F. Bourke's, "The Pluralist Reading of
James Madison's Tenth Federalist," for a concise analysis of
this interpretation.
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blocking interests, while the other depicts it as
recognizing faction and providing the framework for interest
competition.

Both describe Madison as viewing interest in a

negative manner.
As such both views reveal the danger of interpreting
Madison solely through The Federalist.

The same Madison who

argued pessimistically in the Federalist 10 that the power
of self-interest was so strong "it is in vain to say that
enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing
interests" was the same man who stated before the House that
"the great principle of interest is a leading one with
me. " 90

One remark painted interest as negative force, the

other celebrated it.

Evidence exists that casts a cloud

over the image of interest portrayed in The Federalist.
Indeed, as legislator, Madison showed that investigating and
promoting the interests of one's constituents was important
to him.
The need to know the interests of a legislator's
constituents prompted Madison, during Congressional debates
in 1783 over a commercial treaty with Great Britain, to
request "that the commercial interests of Virginia [be]
thoroughly investigated & the final sense of the state
expressed to its representatives." 91

Madison saw nothing
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wrong with verifying Virginia's interests in the matter and
then articulating them to Congress.

In fact, as a member of

the Continental Congress, the protection of Virginia's
interests in the navigation of the Mississippi and the
western land controversies displayed Madison's firm
commitment to his state's "distinctive interests. 1192

The

French Minister, Chevalier de La Luzerne, noted that despite
Madison's devotion to France, his honest character, and
desire "to do good works, ... he is not free from prejudices
in favor of the various claims of Virginia." 93

Similarly,

in 1791 Madison refused to present an anti-slavery Quaker
petition to Congress, because such a request would cause him
to violate the interests of his constituents, from whom "I
derive my public station."

Replying to Quaker John

Pleasant, Madison refused to make "use of my situation ... to
become a volunteer in giving a public wound, as they [his
constituents] would deem it, to an interest on which they
set so great value." 94

Madison even promoted slavery, an

92
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93
institution he

et~ically

despised but did little about, to

preserve the interests of Virginia citizens.
If representatives were to promote interests,
government, moreover, was bound to protect interests and to
insure all segments of society were represented.

In 1785,

Madison criticized the Articles of Confederation for its
failure to protect interests.

"The suffering part, even a

minor part, can not long respect a government which is too
feeble to protect their interests." 95

During the

Constitutional Convention, Madison declared that "it was
politic as well as just that the interests and rights of
every class should be duly represented and understood in
public councils." 96
As these passages indicate, it is clear that Madison
believed interest must have a voice in government.

To

guarantee that American's republican government understood
and represented the interests of a heterogenous society,
Madison advocated a detailed census.

When the census bill

was introduced in January of 1790, Madison confided to
Jefferson that it provided "a kind of information extremely

own slaves. His prediction proved true.
The continued din
for manumission led to an 1806 act by the Virginia
legislature which required that free slaves "leave the
commonwealth within twelve months." JM, Editorial Note,
14:92.
95
96

Ibid., Madison to Monroe, 7 August 1785, 8:334.

Ibid., Constitutional Convention Speech, 26 July
1787, 10:117.

94
requisite to the legislator, and much wanted for the science
of political economy.

1197

An enlightened Madison proposed,

therefore, a schedule that distinguished between gender,
age, and race, as well as one that specified "the number of
persons employed in different professions and arts ... such as
merchants, mechanics, manufacturers, etc., etc." 98
Madison such detail was vital.

To

"Descriptions of the several

classes into which the community was divided, he insisted,
should be accurately known. " 99

Armed with such

information, legislators could then "make proper provision
for the agricultural, commercial and manufacturing
interests. 1110 °

Furthermore, as the country grew, he

asserted a thorough census would allow legislators "an
opportunity of marking the progress of the society, and
distinguishing the growth of every interest.

11101

Against

critics of the proposed census, Madison gave no ground:
In order to accommodate our laws to the real
situations of our constituents, we ought to be
acquainted with that situation.
It may be
impossible to ascertain it as far as I wish, but
we may ascertain it so far as to be extremely
useful when we come to pass laws affecting
97
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particular descriptions of people. 102
To bolster his case further, he pointed to recent bills
passed by the House concerning the manufacturing,
agriculture and commercial sectors of society.

If Congress

had the benefit of census information, he held, his fellow
representatives could have based their arguments on facts,
not conjecture . 103
Evidence such as this leads one to question the
interpretation of Madison devising the Constitution to
thwart interest.

If anything, he did his best to insure

that various interests made their way to the national
government.

Yet by the same token a modern, pluralistic

interpretation of Madison as interest broker does not
accurately describe the views he expressed outside of The
Federalist.

The world of modern politics was alien to

Madison, and thus he did not hold that the public good

102
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96
resulted from the natural competition between interests. 104
His liberal orientation was, at every turn, tempered by his
republican ideal of the "public good," and informed by the
eighteenth century concern that man's tendency to self
interest, when pushed to extremes, perverted the natural
order.
One thus finds in Madison's discourse a curious, and at
first glance contradictory, blending of interest and the
public good.

In 1782, Madison complained that a lack of

knowledge about state interests hampered Congressional
action on currency problems.

The lack of information "in

all questions relative to this subject, makes it difficult
for us to deduce the general interest from a just and fair
comparison of particular interests.

11105

Here and

elsewhere, Madison linked the public good, "the general
interests," to an adequate knowledge of "particular
interests."

For example, at the Virginia ratifying

convention, he supported election of the president by the
electoral college because it satisfied the conflicting
interests of the large and small states and in doing so, he

104
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reasoned, accomplished the public good. 106
Concern for the general interest also induced Madison
in 1794 to reject the interests of merchants in discussion
over commercial discrimination.

He did not object to their

interests being voiced, but he maligned the attitude of
Congressmen who treated merchants' opinion in matters of
trade as "oracles."

Such conduct seemed unthinkable to

Madison, since representatives of the House were bound to
watch over the "joint concerns of the whole. " 107
Madison's definition of interest thus does not fit
neatly within the pluralistic paradigm.

He confided to

James Monroe in 1786 that no maxim appeared more misapplied
than "the current one that the interest of the majority is
the political standard of right and wrong."

If one took the

word" 'interest' as synonymous with 'ultimate happiness' in
which sense it is qualified with every necessary moral
ingredient," he granted that the idea was true.

However, by

taking interest in the popular sense, "as referring to
immediate augmentation of property and wealth, nothing can
be more false." 108

Interest, to be effective and just,

must align with the needs of the whole.

A balance between

self-interest and the public good must be struck.

106
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In the last example, one finds traces of PubliusMadison.

Interest taken to its extreme led to tyranny.

When interest super-seceded reason, it took on its evil
nature, faction . 109
Madison surmised that interest, within its proper
sphere, deserved the full attention of government.

Guided

by reason, and a knowledge of interests, not only of one's
constituencies but of the entire nation, elected officials
could "deduce the general interest from a just and fair
comparison of particular interests." 110

With such

knowledge, as the basis of reflection and debate, Madison
believed that legislators could reach a consensus on just
what constituted the "public good."

Obviously, this mode of

interest expression was politically deferential.

Madison

advocated investigation and vocalization of interests, but
did not guarantee that government would recognize the
validity of any specific interest.

Government's role

consisted of merging interest and the public good onto a
middle ground whereby the antithetical nature of the two
disappeared.
How does one reconcile the Madison who denounced
"faction" in The Federalist with the Madison who maintained

109
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that the public good could not be discerned without intimate
knowledge of the interests of the nation?

Perhaps

resolution of the dilemma centers on seeing The Federalist
as Madison's portrayal of government functioning at its
worst, that is when interest has usurped reason in the minds
of elected officials.

Publius-Madison stressed the

reliability of a system which had its own built in check
against self aggrandizement.

One finds Madison, in the

midst of party strife five years after passage of the
Constitution, reiterating his assertion that the best
provision for a stable government rested with "an
equilibrium in the interests and passions of the Society
itself ... " 111

Yet Madison's statements only admit that

diversity of interests provided security for republican
government.
govern.

He does not admit that it is the best way to

It is now known that The Federalist was aimed at

the elite, educated parts of society. 112

Publius' goal was

to convince members of the upper class that their status and
property could still remain secure under the Constitution,
even if "enlightened'' (upper class) leaders were not at the
helm.

Obviously, the essays had a more partisan character

than is currently acknowledged.
111
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As Garry Wills has pointed out, development of a
political system that treats every man as a knave does not
necessarily imply that only selfish goals exist.

Rather

such a strategic presumption allowed Madison to talk of
safeguards without precluding virtue. 113

Madison's theory

of interest reflected his ideas about human nature, most
succinctly expressed in Federalist 55:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which
requires a certain degree of circumspection and
distrust, so there are other qualities in human
nature which justify a certain portion of esteem
and confidence. 114
If The Federalist dwelled on the negative aspects of
interest, Madison enunciated in other writings the positive
side.

In these latter instances he portrayed a symbiotic

relationship between interest and the common good.

Interest

must always be tied to the public good, but cognizance of
the public good rested on an intrinsic knowledge of
interest.

113
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CHAPTER IV
THE SUI GENERIS MADISON: A PRUDENT POLITICAL ECONOMY
In his theory of interest Madison fused strands of
.republican and liberal ideas, indicating that he did not
find the two paradigms incompatible.

Not surprisingly,

historians have started to see things from a Madisonian
viewpoint.

Recently, historians have approached an uneasy

consensus between liberal and classical interpretations of
the founding period.

Both sides have backed away from

earlier assertions that one or the other ideology dominated
the American revolutionary and founding era.

Lance Banning,

for example, has admitted that he and other historians of
classical republicanism have over-emphasized the importance
of these doctrines and slighted the presence of Lockean
ideas. 1

Many scholars now agree that a variety of political

languages were present during this time.

Isaac Kramnick has

identified four ideologies which contributed to a "profusion
and confusion of political tongues among the founders." 2
The correct view is that there was no homogenous political

1

Lance Banning, "Jefferson Ideology Revisited: Liberal
& Classical Ideas in the New American Republic," William and
Mary Quarterly, 43.1 (January 1986): 3-19, 12-15.
2

Isaac Kramnick, " 'The Great National Discussion':
The Discourse of Politics in 1787," 4.
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language at the time, and that to educated men use of one
ideology seemed compatible with the use of others. 3
The previous chapters have examined the ways in which
Madison's thought coincided with classical and liberal
creeds.

Yet if both ideologies existed in his mind,

follows that they were interwoven.

it

This is evident in his

views on political economy, which display his molding and
merging of different political languages into one.

In the

end, this is to say, Madison's writings blended classical
with liberal ideas, to the end of promoting a society which
freed the individual to fulfill his economic potential, and
yet consulted the public good.

As Madison himself

testified, "the citizens of the U.S. know that their
individual interest is connected with the public
[interest] . " 4
From the early 1780s through 1795 Madison worked to
remove the shackles from an American economy dependent on
British credit, merchants, and ships; instead, as a
legislator he promoted a society compatible to the American
"genius."

A study of Madison's thought on political economy

during this time shows him synthesizing strands of different
theories.

He incorporated those ideas into an ideology

conditioned to the realities of American society.

3
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Before looking at Madison's legislative attempts to
secure the American republic, it is instructive to outline
his view of the ideal society.

His support for free trade

was one of the most consistent themes of his ideology.

In a

1785 letter to James Monroe, for example, Madison confided
to his friend that "a perfect freedom is the system which
would be my choice."

During a Congressional speech four

years later he similarly proclaimed that "commerce ought to
be as free as the policy of nations will admit."

In the

same vein, throughout the meetings of the third congress
Madison repeatedly called himself a friend of free trade and
voiced support for a doctrine "which gives industry a free
course under the impulse of individual interest and the
guidance of individual sagacity." 5
According to Madison, not only did free trade allow
individuals to pursue their economic goals, it encouraged
peaceable relations between nations.

This communication

unified trading partners and made them dependent on the
other's goods.

When such a relationship prevailed, he held,

countries hesitated to declare war on one another, for peace
served and promoted a nation's commerce.

Free trade not

only liberated the individual but restrained international

5
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violence, the greatest danger to republican government. 6
According to Madison, however, free trade alone did not
in itself sustain republican principles.

Commerce must

carry the goods that resulted from the most exalted of
occupations, agriculture.

To his mind, a robust commerce

carrying American agricultural produce overseas provided a
crucial safety valve for republicanism.

Agriculture, then,

provided the foundation for Madison's concept of political
economy.

Agriculture, in his estimation, needed

encouragement because it constituted "the great staple of
America."

In this regard he agreed with Tench Coxe's

statement that agriculture was "the spring of our commerce
and the parent of our manufactures." 7
This defense of agriculture as the true basis of
prosperity aligned Madison with the concepts of Adam Smith
and the French physiocrats.

Madison and Smith stood for the

producer of natural goods, foodstuffs.

In the Wealth of

6
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Nations, Smith asserted that the rapid progress of Americans
resulted from their ability to concentrate their capital in
agriculture. 8

French physiocrats held that agriculture was

more natural and valuable to a nation than an obsession with
manufacturing luxuries. 9
It is important to point out that the type of
agriculture Madison advocated was not limited to subsistence
farming.

The whole purpose of free trade was to take

advantage of the fact that Americans produced far more than
they needed.

This surplus would be shipped to countries

needing essential staples.

In the last part of the

eighteenth century, the growth of markets in Europe and the
West Indies prompted American farmers to pursue a mixed
husbandry, in particular wheat production. 10

While

8
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68.4 (March 1982): 839-840.
The importance of the wheat
market had a personal effect on Madison. In a letter to
Thomas Jefferson in June of 1793, Madison asked for his
friend's comments on a system of crop rotation he had
formed. The number of acres of wheat planted each year,
according to Madison's system, was double that of any other
crop. JM, Madison to Jefferson, 29 June 1793, 15:40-41.
Joyce Appleby points out in, Capitalism and a New Social
Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s, 43, the city of
Baltimore arose in the 1790s from the grain trade.
Two
centers of raising and marketing agriculture produce,
Philadelphia and New York, grew at a rate almost double that
of the rest of the nation.
This work of Appleby's and the
other cited above have gone a long ways towards correcting
the assumption that because the Jeffersonians championed
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classical republicans feared this kind of prosperity because
it led to accumulations of wealth and luxury, and thereby
accelerated the decline of the body politic, Madison saw
surplus crops as a positive measure of the individual
industry of the American people.

The demonstrated

productive capabilities of American farmers,

in turn,

reinforced Madison's belief that industry and labor, in most
circumstances, should be left alone.

Not even the wisest

legislature could create, through legislation, a more
favorable atmosphere for labor than nature. 11
While Madison rejected a classical view of subsistence
agriculture production he still retained classical ideas
about the relationship between independence and property
ownership.

In classical ideology the vitality of republican

government rested on a foundation of independent landowners.
Each was capable of providing for their own needs, and each
zealously guarded the political liberty produced by their
economic independence.

When an individual became dependent

agriculture they adhered to a backward looking ideology
while the Hamiltonians are viewed as advocates of modernity.
This is assumption that McCoy's Elusive Republic builds on
in characterizing the Jeffersonians as followers of
classical republican ideals. As Appleby correctly points out
in the "Agrarian Myth," the battle between the Jeffersonians
and the Federalists should be seen as a struggle between two
different ideas of capitalistic development. Historians,
like McCoy, living in an industrial age see the
Jeffersonian's enthusiasm for agriculture as an attachment
to the past and those who advocated a manufacturingfinancial political economy as progressive.
11

JM, Congressional Speech, 9 April 1789, 12:71.
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on another for subsistence, that person also lost his
political liberty.

The larger the number of people who

lacked independence, the greater the likelihood of
corruption.

In this regard Madison aligned himself with

classical theories.
Madison believed that republican government needed to
rest on a foundation of independent people who supplied
their own needs.

Like other classical republicans, he felt

that when people were independent they jealously guarded
their liberty and republican government.

Thus, in the

Constitutional Convention of 1787, he remarked that the
freeholders of the United States provided the "safest
depositories of Republican liberty." 12

Occupations to be

avoided "consisted of those that make one class of citizens
dependent on another." 13

Madison reiterated the political

and economic importance of an independent citizenry in a
March 5, 1792, article for the National Gazette entitled
"The Republican Distribution of Citizens.''

"The class of

citizens who provide at once their own food and their own
raiment," he held, "may be viewed as the most truly
independent and happy.

They are more; they are the best

basis of public liberty and the strongest bulwark of public

12

James Madison, Notes, 403.

13

JM,

14:20.

"Fashion," National Gazette, 20 March 1792,
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safety. " 14

For Madison, the freedom and happiness of

American society increased in proportion to the agricultural
segment of the population.
In a different vein, however, Madison looked at the
role property played in securing republican government in a
way that diverged markedly from the classical concept.

The

classical conception of property viewed land not as a means
of making money, but rather as a way of "anchoring the
individual in the structure of power and virtue, and
liberating him to practice these ideas." 15

Possession of

ample land allowed certain citizens enough wealth to spend
the majority of their time engaged in securing the common
good through politics.

On the other hand, when Madison

referred to freeholders as the most secure source of
political liberty, he alluded not to owners of vast estates
who lived off the proceeds of their land; rather Madison
celebrated the families who worked their land and who reaped
the benefits of their own labor.

In contrast to British

laborers toiling in degrading, dependent employment in
manufacturing, Madison gloried in "the independent situation
and manly sentiments of American citizens, who live on their
own soil," and "whose labor is necessary for its

14

Marvin Meyers, ed. The Mind of the Founder, 242-243.

15

Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 9.
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cultivation ... " 16

American society would continue to grow

as individuals labored on their property to produce surplus
natural goods.

Virtuous conduct and industry, therefore,

naturally emanated from a Republican government which
allowed citizens the freedom necessary to develop their
faculties.
Yet, if the American economy was to be based on
aggressive exporting of agricultural goods, there needed to
be the means available to transport the goods in ship
bottoms other than foreign ones.

Madison advocated the

creation of a large merchant fleet to streamline the flow of
American foodstuffs overseas.

In a speech to Congress in

May of 1789, he declared himself a friend of shipping.
"I .... shall be always ready to go to as great [of] lengths
in favor of that interest as any gentleman on the floor." 17
A month earlier, Madison had attacked a proposal to place a
heavy duty on hemp because such a measure threatened the
shipbuilding industry. 18

Besides securing independence for

American goods transported overseas, the presence of a
sizeable fleet provided protection for American coasts in
time of war, and also promoted industry.

Because America

16

JM, "Fashion," National Gazette, 20 March 1792,
14:258. Emphasis in the quote is mine.
17

Ibid., Congressional Speech, 4 May 1789, 12:120.
Madison's enthusiastic support for an expanded American
merchant fleet should dispel any lingering visions of
Madison as a supporter of yeoman agriculture.
18

Ibid., Congressional Speech, 16 April 1789, 12:84.
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shipped bulky products, which required more room in ship
holds than manufactured goods, Madison reasoned that as
.Americans produced more goods for export their shipping
capacity must also grow. 19

Economic opportunities would

abound for those who ventured to build ships and carry
.American goods, and Madison meant to encourage such
ventures.
Manufacturers also appeared prominent in Madison's
ideal society, but in a secondary role to agriculture.

For

him, manufactured goods should not become the object of
export trade, but rather provide a source of essentials for
farmers.

Madison remarked that the United States was

fortunate because "so much of the ordinary and most
essential consumption takes place in fabrics which can be
prepared in every family, and which constitute, indeed, the
natural ally of Agriculture.

The former is work within the

doors, as the latter is without." 20

The utility of

manufacturers was based not only on their ability to supply
necessities, but also to the degree they helped promote
republican society.

Manufacturing occupations which were

"least favorable to vigor of body, to the faculties of the
mind, or to the virtues or to the utilities of life, ... ought
to be seen with regret, as long as occupations more friendly
19

20

Ibid., 3 Jan. 1794, 15:169-170.

Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Republican
Distribution of Citizens," National Gazette, 5 March 1792,
242.
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to human happiness lie vacant." 21

The occupations Madison

indicted above possessed a high division of labor and,
therefore, revealed the existence of a subservient wage
labor force.

These manufacturers usually did not provide

necessities, but rather unneeded luxuries.

These

occupations proved the "least desirable in a free state"
because one class of citizens' livelihood depended on the
whim of those who consumed the items they produced.
Manufacturers were welcome only if they produced necessary
goods.

Wage labor, however, which large manufacturers

depended on, was not to become a mainstay of the America
economy, for it threatened the citizen's independence, and
hence the nation's republican character.
This, then, provides a rough outline of Madison's ideal
society.

Based on a thriving, export-oriented agriculture,

whose products made their way to Europe in the bottoms of
America ships, it manufactured only goods necessary for a
society of independent farmers.
provided the foundation.

Republican government

It gave the agriculture-based

citizenry the freedom needed to allow industry to flourish
and prosperity to grow.

Ownership of, and labor on, one's

own land secured economic and political freedom, and in turn
insured that citizens would guard the society responsible
for their freedom.

Madison in this way grafted liberal

ideas of free, self-seeking individuals to classical
21

Ibid., 243.
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concepts of property and independence.

The outcome was a

society which combined liberty and industry with the virtues
of republican government.
Unfortunately for Madison, America in the late
eighteenth century hardly resembled the society he wanted.
The Revolution had done little to remove American commercial
dependence on Great Britain.

British merchants and ships

still dominated American commerce.

English manufacturers

dumped their goods on American markets without penalty,
while American goods entering British ports confronted high
duties.

Direct trade with the West Indies, the colonies'

most lucrative market, remained closed after the Revolution.
All the while, the newly independent states seemed more
prone to bicker among themselves about commercial
regulations than in working to remove the chains tying
American trade to British policies.

Commercial affairs,

Madison worried, demonstrated a "want of concert in matters
where the common interest requires it. " 22

Furthermore, in

Madison's opinion, government both under the Articles and
for a short time after ratification of the Constitution
stood on the edge of bankruptcy.

Revenue was needed to pay

debts and restore honor to the American government.
From 1783 to 1795, the struggle to free America from
its bondage to Britain and reinvigorate the national

22

Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Vices of
the Political System of the United States," 85.
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treasury occupied the majority of Madison's time.

Despite

his approval of free trade, historical circumstances forced
him to promote quite different measures to secure his
country's commercial independence and financial stability.
The fundamental interests of America, he insisted, could not
be sacrificed at the altar of free trade.

Implementation of

free trade, above all, must wait until other nations,
especially the British, abandoned their restrictive trade
policies.

It was also unwise to attempt a policy of free

trade when duties on imports provided an attractive method
for raising funds to pay off war debts and rescue a
floundering treasury.

Theoretical ideas had to be adjusted

to reality.
Madison, therefore, advocated mercantilistic measures
to regulate foreign trade and navigation, with an eye
towards breaking the British monopoly and guiding American
goods into more "natural channels."

He hoped to use

commercial discrimination, a form of economic coercion, in
place of war to break the British stranglehold.

To

complement his policies of discrimination, Madison proposed
duties on imported goods.

To this end, he devised a prudent

ideology of political economy to secure, in the long run,
free trade and an independent American commerce.

The means

he advocated mixed together mercantilism and tenets drawn
from classical republicanism.

Madison meant to realize a

liberal objective through reliance on regulatory measures.
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The final success of his policies, however, rested on the
virtue of the people.

Madison believed the populace would

support and endure any hardships caused by his policies
because the measures promoted "the public good."
Madison's first attempt came with the Virginia Port
Bill, which he introduced in the Virginia House of Delegates
in 1784.

The bill sought to create established ports of

entry in Virginia from which foreign ships were required to
discharge and load their cargo.
purposes.

The bill had several

First it was meant to provide Virginia with

adequate import and export facilities. 23

Second, it sought

to facilitate collection of duties and reduce smuggling.

It

would also secure for the Virginia treasury the tribute of
thirty or forty percent the importing merchants from
Baltimore and Philadelphia had demanded from the state to
bring goods there.

If Virginia charged the same duties and

that money was channeled into the treasury, Madison
believed, it would yield a "surplus above all its wants. " 24
Keeping British captains out of riverside warehouses,
however, comprised the most important reason for the bill's
introduction.

British ships dominated the commerce strewn

throughout Virginia's many river ports.

The bill intended,

above all, to restrict the trade of Great Britain to the
23

At this time Virginians were dependent on importing
merchants from those cities, many of whom were British, or
who had British sympathies.
24

Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:310.
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same level as other foreign nations, who lacked the means to
control as many ports as the British.

Furthermore, Madison

hoped to prevent the recurrence of the "Scotch Monopoly,"
which provided initial favors to Virginia planters, but
ended with the farmers deeply in debt to British
interests. 25

Restricting the British to certain ports gave

,local shipping an opportunity to develop in areas that
foreign vessels could not go, and freed farmers from the
unrepublican specter of debt.
Passing of the Port Bill proved quite a struggle. Ports
not named in the bill protested vigorously.

Madison hoped

to name only Alexandria and Norfolk as established ports of
entry, but opposition forced him to add York, Tappahannock
and Bermuda Hundred.

Discreet advocates of the British

monopoly joined forces with merchants interested in
maintaining the status quo.

They, in turn, enlisted the

support of planters who wanted ships at their own
wharves. 26

Madison's reaction to them proved quite

instructive.
In the midst of debate an exasperated Madison
complained to Jefferson that opponents of the measure
attacked the bill for violating the concepts of free trade.
These critics charged the bill restricted the gifts nature
had bestowed upon Virginia.
25

Ibid., 315.

26

Ibid., 315.

Madison's scorn for his foes
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was quite apparent.

Opponents, he charged, deluded the

people into not seeing the measure's purpose and necessity,
"They do

the liberation of trade from the British monopoly.

not serve the public good," he observed, "only their own
interest." 27

Against his critics, Madison maintained that

the bulldog grip the British had on American commerce
required extraordinary measures.

Although a firm advocate

of free trade, Madison did not hesitate to abandon the
principle when the larger "public good" so dictated.

In

this respect narrow, individual interest had to be harnessed
to the larger interests of the whole.

Free trade could not

become a reality until American commerce was free and
Britain recognized reciprocity in trade.

The Port bill was

Madison's first attempt to realize this goal.
The Port Bill gave Madison only a shallow victory.

He

had hoped the bill would encourage other states to implement
similar policies, but his message went unheeded.

A year

after the passage of the Port Bill, Madison complained to
James Monroe that American "trade was never more completely
monopolized by Great Britain ... than it is at this
moment." 28

Two months later a frustrated Madison wrote

again to say he would agree to anything if the state
legislatures would just give Congress the power to regulate

27

JM, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 27 April 1785,
8:100-102.
28

Ibid., Madison to James Monroe, 21 June 1785, 8:307.
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trade.

He promised that in order to get the states

compliance, he would agree to more frequent Congressional
elections, an increase in Congressional numbers, shorter
terms for members, and allow no regulatory trade bill to
become law unless passed by a majority of the states.
Madison felt lawmakers had their priorities backward.

They

feared giving Congress the power to regulate trade more than
the threat presented by the British monopoly, a grievous
error to his mind.

However, representatives on the state

and national level felt otherwise, causing a distraught
Madison to plead with them "not [to] sacrifice the end to
the means.

1129

Having failed to gain regulatory power for

Congress under the Articles, Madison urged creation of a new
system that had the power to deal with the British menace.
The calling of the Constitutional Convention provided
Madison the opportunity to correct many flaws he saw in the
Articles.

The lack of a central power to regulate trade was

an, if not the most, important one.

Madison confided to

Jefferson in March of 1786 that "in fact most of our
political evils may be traced to our commercial, as most of
our moral to our political.

1130

To his mind government's

role in a free society consisted of acting as a neutral

29

Ibid., Madison to James Monroe, 7 August 1785,

8:334.
30

Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 18 March 1786, 8:502.
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arbiter between its citizens. 31

Yet he realized a national

government must have the power to deal with foreign nations,
especially those who applied restrictive and unfair trade
practices.

The states had failed miserably in their attempt

to deal with commercial matters.

Madison felt it was time

to create a national government, and provide it with power
to solve the country's commercial woes.

"If it be necessary

to regulate trade at all it is necessary to lodge the power,
where it can be regulated effectively." 32
Madison was a rarity in Southern politics.

In this regard,
Unlike many of

his fellow Virginians, he trusted a national government to
draft trade regulations that would benefit all. 33
In the Constitutional Convention the discussion of the
proposed government's power brought major disagreements,
both sectional and ideological, to the surface.

During the

discussion of duties and impost regulation, Madison's fellow
Virginian, George Mason, urged the Convention to incorporate
31

On government acting as a neutral arbiter between
interests see Meyers' Mind of the Founder, 96, which
contains an April 16, 1787 letter of Madison's to
Washington. In it Madison revealed that republican
governments to date had lacked "some disinterested and
dispassionate umpire" to settle disputes. See also ibid.,
244, for Madison's article "On Property" in which he
concludes that a just government is one which "impartially
secures to every man whatever is his own." The emphasis is
Madison's. In addition consult Isaac Kramnick's "The 'Great
National Discussion': The Discourse of Politics in 1787," 332, especially pages six and seven. Kramnick makes an
argument similar to the one outlined above.
32
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into the Constitution a resolution forbidding the new
government to tax exports because such a duty would fall
heaviest on the South.

Madison quickly challenged Mason.

He asserted that the new government should have the power to
tax exports.

This power should not be yielded for it

provided the government with a possible source of revenue.
Furthermore, it was only right that Southerners bear the
lion's share of an export tax.

Madison believed funds

raised through such a tax were necessary to finance naval
protection of ships carrying mostly Southern goods. 34

Five

days after his rebuttal of Mason, Madison again argued for
the power to tax exports.

He claimed export duties "may not

be expedient at present", but like imports they may have to
be regulated in order to gain revenue, encourage domestic
manufacturers, and, most importantly, procure "equitable
regulations from other nations." 35

The seeds of Madison's

commercial discrimination policy can be seen in this remark
made during the Constitutional Convention.

The policy would

blossom and then wither during Madison's years as a
Congressman.
Despite Madison's failure to secure Congressional power
to tax exports, the new Constitution did give Congress much

34

35

James Madison, Notes, 467-468.

Ibid., 499-500. Later that same day a motion passed
which said that no tax should be laid on exports. Virginia
voted with the majority with two dissenting voices,
Washington's and Madison's.
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greater power to regulate trade than had the Articles.

Once

passage of the Constitution was assured and after Madison's
election to a seat in the House, he immediately renewed his
effort for regulatory measures.
During the first session of Congress in 1789 Madison
proposed impost duties to raise money for the treasury.

In

the debate, Madison urged his fellow Representatives to look
after local interests, but also to consider "the general
interest of the Union. " 36

He criticized representatives

who proposed a drop in impost rates on goods consumed
primarily in their constituency.

All, he insisted, must pay

an equal share, for republican government was based on the
premise that it "will equally effect all. " 37

Madison

rebuked those who argued that a duty on Jamaican rum would
cause people to start smuggling the spirit as they had
during British rule.

He could not believe "the virtue of

our citizens is so weakly fortified." 38

He defied

comparisons between an unfair British tax and a just
American one.

The people would comply because they saw a

just end for the measure, stability for the Treasury.

While

generally pleased with the outcome of impost rates, Madison
criticized the inability of some Representatives to look

36
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37
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beyond the scope of their local interests.

Such attitudes

caused the duties to lean toward local interests "at the
expense of the general interest. " 39

The debates over

duties clearly revealed the classical side of Madison, one
concerned deeply with the "public good", and one willing to
enact regulatory measures in order to secure the interests
of all.
Emotions ran high as Congress debated the second half
of Madison's revenue making measure, which called for a
tonnage duty, discriminating between ships from nations who
had a commercial treaty with America, and those who did not.
As Drew McCoy has pointed out, the purpose of the bill
centered on removing British domination through
discriminatory commercial legislation. 40

It provided a

prime example of Madison adopting mercantilist measures to
secure free trade and tying, ultimately, the success of his
measures to the citizens' virtue and frugality.

That is to

say, classical ideas provided the means to a liberal end,
free commerce.

In the test of wills between the British and

American people, Madison believed, furthermore, the
republican character of the latter's people insured they
would endure hardship and deprivation of a trade war better
than their British counterparts.
In introducing the measure on April 8, 1789, Madison
39
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outlined several purposes.

The tonnage duties, he argued,

would reduce the imbalance of trade with Great Britain.
While American ports remained open to all English goods,
Britain refused to recognize a reciprocal policy towards the
United States.

As a result of the trade imbalance caused by

this policy, commerce between the two nations exceeded "what
.may be considered its natural boundary. " 41

British trade

policies killed competition and allowed British imports to
exceed American exports by large amounts.

Once natural

competition resumed, or a set of equally restrictive trade
measures were enacted, the ratio of imports to exports would
balance out.

Britain, in addition, had continued to close

the West Indies to direct American trade, one of the most
natural and important outlets for American goods.

Thus,

according to Madison, until the British retracted their
extreme mercantilist policies, America must adopt the same
measures to protect its own interests.

Throughout, Madison

maintained his adherence to free trade, but English policies
forced him to propose measures designed to restrict the
British, and secure American commercial independence. 42
41

JM, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 30 June 1789,

12:269.
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Ibid., Congressional Speech, 21 April 1789, 12:102.
The idea that commercial discrimination could bring Britain
to its knees was not new. McCoy, in the Elusive Republic,
143, points out that Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations
mentioned the British economy was vulnerable to the type of
scheme that Madison introduced fifteen years later. Whether
Madison got his idea from the Wealth of Nations, remains
unclear.
However, Madison had read Smith's book. While in
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The Tonnage discrimination bill also intended to
encourage .American shipping.

According to Madison, ships

built and owned by Americans would pay a smaller duty than
foreign ships.

Southerners charged that higher duties

placed too great a burden on them.

Madison replied that the

measures would hurt the South only for short time, until
American shipping had grown enough to handle the bulk of
Southern produce. 43

The end result would benefit "the

common good" of the entire nation, releasing .American
farmers from their dependence on British bottoms, cheapening
the transportation of .American goods, and providing
protection for the coast.

The small sacrifice the South had

to endure, he argued would, in the long run, provide
benefits run not only for the section, but for the entire
nation as well. 44

By acting for the common good now,

citizens could at a later date enjoy the freedom to pursue
their interests.
In addition, Madison believed than an enlarged
.American shipping fleet held out other advantages, above all
the opening of the French market for .American goods.
Madison's leaning towards France in foreign economic policy
Paris Jefferson received a letter from Madison asking to buy
for him a collection of tracts on French Economics that were
"much referred to by Smith on the wealth of nations." JM,
Madison to Jefferson, 27 April 1785, 8:266.
43
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antedated the Revolution.

45

Looking to break the English

monopoly by also exploiting other markets, his proposed
tonnage duties would invigorate trade with an ally depressed
"beyond what nature deserves. " 46

Even the small amount of

commerce that made its way to France went via England,
proving to Madison that "American commerce flows in an
improper channel" and demanded rectification. 47
Elimination of artificial obstructions between original
production and final consumption created a truly "natural
economy." 48

Madison confided a similar thought in a letter

to Jefferson.

"American trade will not be in its proper

channels until it should flow directly to the countries
making the exchange." 49
Discriminatory tonnage duties, then, would hinder
British mercantile interests, force reciprocity, break down
barriers that kept American commerce from flowing (according
to Smithian laws of political economy) to its most "natural"
markets, and promote the growth of an American fleet.
American shipping would allow its citizens to take advantage

45

Madison's bias towards France is further evidenced
by his decision in 1792 to accept an offer of citizenship
granted him by the French Government.
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of other markets, especially France, and at the same time
increase the nation's safety and economic independence. 50
If Madison's goals seemed admirable, many questioned
the effectiveness of commercial discrimination and the
ability of the republic to withstand a trade war with Great
Britain.

Would discriminatory tonnage rates, some asked,

really free American trade and provide the initiative for
development of a commercial fleet?

What adverse effects,

asked others, would result if his plan failed?

Northeastern

commercial interests, in particular, opposed Madison's
measures.

They worried that Great Britain might respond by

cutting off all trade with the United States.

America, they

held, was too dependent on Great Britain to risk offending
her.
Madison, on the other hand, saw things differently.
Great Britain needed American trade more than America needed
Great Britain's.

He had no fear of British retaliation.

"Her interests can be mortally wounded, while ours are
invulnerable. " 51

According to Madison, America supplied

agriculture products to the British Empire, necessities of
life, while Americans received in return superfluities,
manufactured luxury goods.

British manufacturers and

laborers depended on American consumers and if an economic
war occurred, American consumers could, by adopting frugal
50
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habits and ceasing to buy British goods, throw English
laborers out of work.

By the same token, the lack of

American foodstuffs would cause food shortages in portions
of the British Empire, eventually forcing the British to
accede to the republic's demands. 52
by independent American farmers,

The surplus produced

furthermore, would always

secure a permanent market, unless the people of a European
nation decided to stop eating.

Clinching the case for

Madison was his belief that "the produce of this country is
more necessary to the rest of the world than that of other
countries ... 1153
In the event of a trade war with Great Britain, Madison
similarly held, these natural advantages, combined with the
virtue of the American people, insured victory.

Knowing

that the struggle was for the "public good" the citizens of
the United States would endure the burdens of an embargo
better than their British counterparts. 54

Mercantilist

measures united with the virtue and frugality of the
American people formed the basis of Madison's plan to
liberate the commerce of his nation.

But despite his

eloquent arguments for discriminatory tonnage duties, the
Senate, in June of 1789, struck out the clause that

52
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differentiated between nations in treaty with the U.S. and
nations who were not.

Fear of the British retaliation

proved too strong, and commercial discrimination died.
Defeated in his first attempt, Madison resurrected his
discriminatory policy four years later when British actions
against American commerce again aroused public passions.
Looking again to secure a doctrine of free trade, he
advocated the same type of regulatory measures and stressed
reliance on the republican character of the citizenry.

When

England and France once again turned to military force to
settle their differences in 1790s, the conflict provided
Madison with his opportunity.
As conflict between France and England began anew,
Britain insured that relations with the U.S. would also
flare up by adopting policies that struck hard at American
commercial interests.

France's fear that the West Indies

would be blockaded by the British led them to open the
French West Indies to "neutral" American ships, which had
not been the case before the war.

London's attempt to block

the opportunistic French ploy led to passage of the odious
Orders in Council.

Passed in June and November of 1793, the

orders were immediately provocative.

The June Order allowed

the British to seize and purchase the cargoes of neutral
ships bound for French ports, or those under French control.
While it hurt the pride of American ship captains to have
their vessels arbitrarily boarded and searched by British
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naval officers, no monetary losses took place.

The second,

however, gave British captains the authority to detain and
confiscate neutral ships carrying the produce of a French
colony, or supplies used by such a colony.

In short order,

the British seized about three hundred vessels, throwing
their crews into foul jails or "inviting" them to join the
British Navy.
To Madison it was apparent that the havoc the Orders in
Council played with American trade in the West Indies
manifested the "ill will and contempt of Great Britain
towards us." 55
reach.

A diplomatic agreement remained out of

The missions of John Adams and Thomas Pinckney had

failed to secure any good.

American diplomats sent to

London were frozen out, making them, according to Adams'
dispatches, "as insignificant here as you can imagine. " 56
To change the intolerable attitude of the British required
harsh measures.
Acting to implement Jefferson's 1793 report on the
state of American Commerce in Foreign Countries, Madison
introduced in the House seven resolutions designed to create
a policy of commercial discrimination.

His underlying

assumption was the same as 1789, and he relied on the same
arguments, with one new addition.
55
56

JM, Madison to Horatio Gates, 24 March 1794, 15:287.

John Adams to John Jay, quoted in Thomas A. Bailey,
A Diplomatic History of the American People, 8th edition,
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 55.
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Discrimination, Madison again argued, would work
because Great Britain was more dependent on the United
States than America was on England.

Discrimination would

also succeed because of the virtue and frugality of the
American people. 57

Finally, Madison's prudent policy

provided a middle way.

It preserved the national honor by

acting against Great Britain, but did so short of war,
something dangerous to republican government and something
for which America was ill-prepared.
In considering the import and tonnage duties to be
placed on foreign vessels originating from a country who did
not have a commercial treaty with the United States,
Madison again urged his fellow Congressman to remember that
"small local sacrifices must be made to obtain a greater
good." 58

The higher the duties and tonnage fees the

clearer the message sent to Great Britain.
This time discussion of import and tonnage duties did
not produce the heated debate they had in 1789; instead
Congressmen clashed mainly over the practicality of
Madison's proposals.

Massachusetts Representatives Samuel

Dexter and Fisher Ames, along with Thomas Fitzsimmons of

57

As he had in 1789, Madison argued for discrimination
because of the benefits American shipping would receive. Yet
he used this line of reasoning less than in 1789, possibly
because Madison did not want to encourage Federalist ideas
that called for a buildup of the American Navy.
See JM,
Congressional Speech, 3 January 1794, 15:169.
58

JM, Congressional Speech, 6 Feb. 1794, 15:248.
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Pennsylvania and William L. Smith of South Carolina, proved
Madison's most vocal opponents.

They held to the Federalist

line that discriminatory measures would cause a trade war
with Great Britain.

Such an event, they insisted, would

cripple .American trade, but cause little damage to the
British Empire.
Madison, in response, argued that something had to be
done to the British.

The world would be a wonderful place

if nations, like the British, tore down their trade
barriers.

However, America could not adopt a policy which

did not exist anywhere else. 59

The trade imbalance and

British high handed seizures on the open sea had to be
stopped.
In 1794, as in 1789, Madison pointed out that England's
economy was weak because it rested on an unnatural
foundation .

.America's advantages over Britain resulted from

the country's natural economy and the character of its
people.

Great Britain sent the U.S. "superfluities" or

luxury goods.

As a result, the British economy was

dependent on the whims of her consumers.
By 1794 Madison believed he had empirical evidence for
these perceptions, gleaned from his study of the plight of
British manufacturing in 1792.
National Gazette, "Fashion"

59

15:182.

His 1792 article for the

dealt with this topic.

Ibid., Congressional Speech, 14 January 1794,

In it
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Madison discussed a petition the Prince of Wales had
received from the buckle manufacturers in Birmingham, Wassal
and Wolverhampton.

According to the petition, their

industry stood on the verge of ruin because a change of
fashion had caused people to start using shoestrings and
slippers.

As a result of this "whim" twenty thousand people

lost their jobs.

The manufacturers implored the Prince to

help change fashion back in their favor by ordering his
staff to wear buckles.
To Madison the story had immediate consequences for
American foreign policy.

The plight of the manufacturers

and their workers, whose employment came from the
"precarious source of fashion and superfluity," provided
both a lesson and an opportunity for Americans. 60

The

lesson was simple: the more people a nation employed in
trades dependent on external commerce, the more it became
dependent on the caprice of other nations.
the fate of the British worker.

Madison lamented

"Can any despotism be more

cruel than a situation, in which the existence of thousands
depends on one will, and that will on the most slight and
fickle of all motives." 61

Equally important was the

opportunity the story pointed to: an economy based on
manufacturing, which heavily depended on fashion, was,

60

Ibid., "Fashion," National Gazette, 20 March 1792,

14:258.
61

Ibid., 258.

132
Madison believed, susceptible to the measures he proposed to
Congress in 1794.

The unnatural British economy

vulnerable because it was dependent.

was

Its foundation rested

on laborers engaged in wage labor, who had, therefore,
neither economic nor political liberty.

Consequently, their

existence depended on the manufacturers for whom they
worked, who in turn, relied on habits of fashion and the
consumption patterns of foreign nations.

A change in

fashion or a decline in consumption threatened the whole
false structure.
Britain's former colonies, to the contrary, exported
"chiefly the necessaries of life, or raw materials."
American goods always secured a sure market.

America,

moreover, could do without goods it received from other
countries "or produce substitutes. " 62

If forced into a

contest of self denial to protect her national interest,
"our country may make her enemies feel the extent of her
power. " 63

In an economic war, he granted, America would

not emerge unscathed, but if the "virtue and temper of our
fellow citizens were not mistaken, the experiment would find

62

Ibid., Congressional Speech, 3 January 1794, 15:169.
Madison also saw a golden lining in his discriminatory
policy for manufacturers. He reasoned that if you
discouraged the manufacturing of one nation you might build
up your own, and, in fact, encourage manufacturers to move
to the America, whose burgeoning country might provide a
lucrative market for the manufacturers. Consult JM,
Congressional Speech, 14 January 1794, 15:183.
63

Ibid., 3 January 1794, 15:169.
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in them a far greater readiness to bear it." 64

Unlike a

military contest, an economic conflict allowed America to
fight from a position of strength.
Another benefit of Madison's policy was, then, the
ability to avoid military war.

By 1794, Britain's arbitrary

seizures had enraged many to the point of war.

Even the

ardent Anglophile, Alexander Hamilton, considered Britain's
actions "atrocious" and advised President Washington to
prepare for war. 65

Madison wanted to punish the British,

but avoid martial conflict.
Madison, like all people influenced by classical
republicanism, knew that "of all the enemies to public
liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded." 66

It

provided the impetus for the development of armies,

(which

Federalists were attempting to raise at that time), meant
higher taxes and increased debt, all instruments of corrupt
governments intent on tyrannizing the people.

To Madison's

mind, his prudent measures had the advantage of avoiding war
and fighting a battle on terms which gave America a decided
edge.

In military matters, he advised, England "is an

overmatch for us."

64

However, in commercial operations, "here

Ibid., Congressional Speech, 14 January 1794,

15:189.
~ Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People, 73.
66

Marvin Meyers, Mind of the Founder, "Political
Observations," 20 April 1795, 15:287.
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the United States are unquestionably
Great Britain." 67

an over-match for

Logically, then, the United States stood

a better chance of forcing concessions through commercial
discrimination than by use of military force.
Madison's proposals met with qualified support
throughout the nation.
country.

Support came from most parts of the

Three American ship captains, languishing in a

Kingston, Jamaica jail sent Madison a letter supporting his
resolutions. 68
newspapers.

The letter made its way into many

The momentum commercial discrimination had

gained, however, quickly waned in early March of 1794, when
the British seized and condemned one hundred American
vessels in the West Indies.

Sterner measures were needed,

something even Madison admitted to Jefferson when he
reported the newest British outrage. 69

In response, a

thirty day embargo was passed by both Houses.

The decision

by Washington to send a diplomatic mission headed by John
Jay to solve the crisis followed on the heels of the
embargo.
67

Jay's mission, for all practical purposes, ended

Ibid., 296.

68

JM, Madison from Joshua Barney and Others, 13 March
1794, 15:281-282. The popularity of Madison's proposals can
also be assessed by the fate dealt to opponents of his
measures. Representatives Fitzsimmons and Dexter, two of
the more outspoken opponents, were defeated in their reelection bid, along with several other Congressmen,
primarily for their attacks on Madison's policy.
See JM,
Editorial Note, 15:148-149.
69

15:278.

Ibid., Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 12 March 1794,

135
Madison's last attempt as a Congressman to implement his
policy of commercial discrimination.
Despite the fact that Madison's ideas never came to
fruition until Jefferson's presidency, a study of it reveals
the sui generis nature of his ideology.

It shows Madison

reconciled individual interest with the public good.

In

this regard, a summary of his political ideology is found in
some comments Madison made to James Monroe in 1785.

He

confided to his friend that he wished for a system of free
trade, but that before such a reality could occur America
must first climb out of debt and assure that other nations
concurred in the policy. 70

The comments reveal, on one

hand, Madison's wish to free the individual to pursue his
self interest.

As he noted in another context, "the great

principle of interest is a leading one with me." 71

But by

the same token Madison understood circumstances would arise
in which the national interest called for firm regulatory
measures and required the citizenry to act virtuously.
Thus he abandoned neither virtue nor interest, but
blended them together.

While historians today continue to

present classical and liberal republican ideologies as
antagonistic to each other, Madison's prudent political
economy provides a clear exception.

He felt the people had

an "enlightened self interest" which allowed them individual
70

JM, Madison to Monroe, 21 April 1785, 8:333.

71

Ibid., Congressional Speech, 21 April 1789, 12:99.
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initiative, but in times of crisis prompted them to
sacrifice their interests to preserve the government that
allowed individual freedom.

Without liberty virtue could

not exist, and neither could liberty without virtue.
provided freedom, the other protected it.

One

Madison's Port

Bill, his arguments before and during the Constitutional
Convention for extensive Congressional powers to regulate
trade, and his policy of commercial discrimination, arose
from his belief that they "promoted the public good."

They

fostered the general good because they secured American
commercial independence, promoted individual interest by
creating a system of free trade, and provided a means of
avoiding war.

Madison's belief that the people would abide

by and even support such measures, despite the deprivation
they suffered, shows how deeply classical republicanism
affected him.

Yet Madison's end was a liberal one.

Once

reached, this goal would leave the citizens free from
commercial regulations, measures Madison termed himself as
"generally unjust, oppressive and impolitic." 72
middle way existed between virtue and interest.

A prudent
Exploration

of this middle way illustrates Madison's ability to
consolidate fibers from different ideologies and weave them
into a system uniquely his own.

72

Ibid., Congressional Speech, April 9, 1789, 12:71.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In early 1792 Madison published an article on the "The
Spirit of Governments" in the National Gazette.

In it he

reminded his audience that "no government is perhaps
reducible to a sole principle of operation." 1

Even in

societies where the previous statement seemed erroneous, he
noted, oftentimes "different [and] heterogeneous principles
mingle their influence ... " 2

Historians of Madison's

thought have, unfortunately, ignored these comments,
focusing instead on explaining his ideas through singular
paradigms built on narrow slices of his writings.

This

study, on the contrary, holds that a clearer understanding
of Madison emerges if one explains his thought through more
than one paradigm or section of his writings.
Reducing the mind of Madison to "a sole principal of
operation" slights the breadth of his study and experiences,
and discounts the supple nature of his intellect.

His

education, writings, personal library and political career
reveal the presence of both classical and liberal

1

Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder "The Spirit of
Governments," National Gazette, February 20, 1792, 239.
2

Ibid., 239.
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convictions and concerns.

When he referred to political

theorists in his writings from 1751-1795, Madison mentioned
Locke and Montesquieu most often.

His comment to Jefferson

in 1825 that the writings of Sidney and Locke provided
indispensable information about the cause of liberty was not
accidental. 3

In referring to these two authors--

representatives of republican and liberal ideologies,
respectively--Madison testified to the influence of the two
traditions upon him.
Narrow interpretations of Madison have encouraged
narrow readings of Madison.

Critics and even admirers of

Madison view The Federalist as the Alpha and Omega of his
thought.

For many it remains a standard of American

political theory.

Yet the high regard The Federalist

eventually garnered never permeated Madison's mind.

Both

during and after completion of it, he sought to keep his
role secret.

Even his best friend, Jefferson, did not learn

of his role in the project until after ratification of the
Constitution.

By that time the essays were published in a

two volume set, and Jefferson had already learned of his
friend's participation from other sources. 4

Madison

revealed his authorship to Jefferson in late 1788.

He

referred to it in a casual way, as something trivial that
had slipped his mind.

"Col. Carrington," he wrote:

3

Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 8 February 1825, 444.

4

Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 47.

139
tells me he has sent you the first volume of the
federalist, and adds the 2d. by this conveyance. I
believe I never have yet [the rest of the quote is
in code] mentioned to you that publication.
It
was undertaken last fall by Jay, Hamilton and
myself.
The proposal came from the two former.
Though carried in concert the writers are not
mutually answerable for all the ideas of each
other there being seldom time for even a perusal
of the pieces by any but the writer himself . 5
Madison never developed the attachment to The Federalist
that others, including Jefferson, felt.

6

If Madison

referred with pride to any of his writings it was "Memorial
and Remonstrance."

One scholar, John Zvsper, has argued

that much of the writings of Madison-Publius was just
rhetoric, implying that Madison never really believed much
of the doctrine contained in The Federalist. 7

While

somewhat overstated, Zvsper's comments rightly emphasize
that there is more to Madison's thought than The Federalist.
There remains, then, the need for more study of
Madison's political theories.

This thesis has attempted to

explain a slice of his doctrines, and also suggest a new way
to study him.

Social historian Victoria Bonnell has noted

that in analyzing complex events "a single theory, however
5

JM, Madison to Jefferson, 11 August 1788, 11:227.

6

Yet it must also be noted that Madison and Jefferson
included The Federalist in their list of textbooks for law
students at the University of Virginia. Along with The
Federalist, they included the Declaration of Independence,
the Virginia Report of 1799, and Washington's Inaugural and
Farewell Speeches, a rather curious assortment of sources.
Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, 442-446.
7

John Zvsper, ''The Madisonian Systems," Western
Political Quarterly 37.2 (1984), 236-256.
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rich and multi-variate, will seldom suffice.
usually have multiple causes ... " 8

Complex events

To paraphrase Bonnell,

one might argue similarly that in analyzing complex
individuals like Madison, no single theory, intellectual
paradigm or source, no matter how profound, will suffice.
Complex figures like Madison were influenced by multiple
theories.
Perhaps Peter Onuf is right.

Scholars grew discouraged

about the scholarship of the early republic which came from
the bicentennial because they missed seeing how recent works
exposed the complexity of the founding period.

Instead,

they eagerly awaited the discovery of a new paradigm hoping
it would, through a single interpretative lens, neatly
explain the Constitutional era.

The answer, however, may

lie so close to us that, like the proverbial snake, it waits
to bite.

A thorough study which examines all the sources,

remains faithful to the historical context of events, and
which at its inception does not limit itself to one
explanatory paradigm, may eliminate much of the ambiguity
which surrounds the founding period, and, more to the point,
the thought of the nation's the least known but "most
powerful and probing intellect," 9 James Madison.
8

Victoria Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Worker's
Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow,
1900-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.)
9

Jack N. Rakove, James Madison: And the Creation of
the American Republic (Glenview, IL: Little, Brown Higher
Education,) 1990, 181.
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